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What is the significance of authoritarianism to U.S. foreign policy? Promoting 
democracy is a key element of U.S. foreign policy, and Washington conventionally 
criticizes authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the United States traditionally praises 
authoritarian regimes that allow pluralism. But these attitudes may or may not correlate 
with improved foreign relations. To what extent is the softening of authoritarian rule 
responsible for improved foreign relations as opposed to other factors? This thesis 
compares U.S. foreign relations with three authoritarian states: Myanmar, Vietnam, and 
North Korea. The cases represent varying degrees of authoritarian rule and varying levels 
of cooperation with Washington. Findings from this thesis highlight the significance of 
authoritarian rule as a driver of U.S. foreign policy. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is the significance of authoritarianism to U.S. foreign policy? Promoting 
democracy is a key element of U.S. foreign policy, and Washington conventionally 
criticizes authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the United States traditionally praises 
authoritarian regimes that allow pluralism. But these attitudes may or may not correlate 
with improved foreign relations. But to what extent is the softening of authoritarian rule 
responsible for improved foreign relations as opposed to other factors? This thesis will 
compare U.S. foreign relations with three authoritarian states: Myanmar, Vietnam, and 
North Korea. The cases represent varying degrees of authoritarian rule and varying levels 
of cooperation with Washington. Findings from this thesis will illuminate the significance 
of authoritarian rule as a driver of U.S. foreign policy. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Research for this thesis will help to clarify how much the tendencies of U.S. 
foreign policy toward authoritarian states depend on the softening of authoritarianism. 
Even though the United States pursues spreading democracy, having diplomatic relations 
with authoritarian states is possible in certain environments. That means authoritarianism 
is not a sufficient condition for the United States to sever normal diplomatic relations. 
Mapping this gap is the purpose of this thesis. There might be various essential 
preconditions of the order of priority that facilitate the relationships. If the degree of 
authoritarianism is revealed concretely, the reader can better predict the relationship 
between the United States and the authoritarian state.  
Another significance of the research is that the study tests how much the United 
States values democracy over other things. The U.S. National Security Strategy, which 
presents the direction of government operations, depicts democracy as a U.S. interest and 
also says that “Even when we are focused on interests such as counterterrorism, 
nonproliferation, or enhancing economic ties, we will always seek in parallel to expand 
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individual rights and opportunities through our bilateral engagement.”1 In this regard, 
testing some cases will verify how the United States puts these words into practice. By 
examining some cases, this thesis evaluates how the United States considers the value of 
democracy in specific conditions compared to other values.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Literature review illustrates the basis of U.S. foreign policy and concept of 
authoritarianism.  
1. Basis of U.S. Foreign Policy 
Periodically, the U.S. administration publishes a National Security Strategy, 
which is the foundation of U.S. policy. This document depicts the direction of the United 
States: what the national interests are, and how to protect U.S. security. Not only does the 
document indicate national strategy, but it also includes the values that the United States 
pursues. One typical example of an important value is democracy. All U.S. 
administrations include support for promoting democracy. In this context, the reader can 
see some values collide with each other, even though all the values are needed for the 
state.  
In some cases, for example, the United States has good relations with other states 
despite the state being a non-democratic regime. In other cases, the United States insists 
on democracy before having normal relations with a state. Yet, no studies cover the 
relations or the influence between the level of authoritarianism and the U.S. relationship 
with Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea. A well-known commentary offering one 
explanation for this difference is Jeane Kirkpatrick’s article, “Dictatorships and Double 
Standards,” which urges U.S. foreign policy to seek realistic demands on America’s 
allies.2 But this piece represented policy advocacy rather than analytic research, is now 
quite dated, and is also lacking attention to U.S. relations with Myanmar, Vietnam, and 
North Korea.  
                                                 
1 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 38, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
2 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships’ Double Standards,” Commentary 68, no. 5 (November 1979), 34. 
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2. U.S. Relationship with Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea 
Indeed, as shown in this section, no studies cover the influence of the level of 
authoritarianism on the U.S. relationships with Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea. 
This section examines the pre-existing research regarding U.S. foreign policy to each of 
these states.  
a. Myanmar 
Research on the U.S.–Myanmar relationship presents various types of analyses: 1) 
U.S. foreign policy toward Myanmar, 2) the balance of power in the Asian region 
between China and the United States, 3) and the strategic importance of Myanmar. First, 
in U.S. foreign policy toward Myanmar, the Congressional Research Service periodically 
covers the roles and impacts of U.S. foreign policy to the U.S.–Myanmar relationship. By 
tracing the process of transition, researchers introduce various assessments regarding 
both the United States’ actions and reactions toward Myanmar.  
The most recent research is the U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 113th 
Congress. 3  In this report, the author focuses on two years of the second Obama 
Administration and analyzes U.S. policies. The author characterizes these policies during 
2011–12 as: 1) more aggressive engagement with domestic affairs in Myanmar, and 2) 
determining whether to lift economic sanctions. For example, a debate addressed whether 
the pace of easing sanctions was appropriate. At the end of the report, the author 
proposed that these significant political aspects of Myanmar should be monitored: 1) 
President Thein Sein’s vision, 2) military leadership on political reform, and 3) ethnic 
conflict. 4 The United States has a cautious stance regarding actual change, not only 
institutional changes, but also practical changes such as efforts to improve human rights. 
                                                 
3 Michael F. Martin, U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress (CRS Report No. 




This report indicates that the contemporary U.S.–Myanmar relationship at least in part 
depends on Myanmar’s transition to a democratic regime.5 
As mentioned previously, an important policy is that of economic sanctions. Since 
these sanctions hindered the development of Myanmar and cut international ties, the 
economic sanctions are the core factor in the relationship. Some researchers think the 
economic sanctions were positive, leading the democratic transition from an authoritarian 
state. Others think that the economic sanctions worsened Myanmar’s situation regarding 
a military junta or human rights because the sanctions would not influence elites 
directly.6 One expert on Myanmar, Leon T. Hadar, doubts the effect of the sanctions and 
argues that “U.S. unilateral sanctions against Burma have not achieved the goal of 
ousting the authoritarian government from power. Instead, they had harmful effects on 
U.S. diplomatic and economic interests and on the economic and political well-being of 
the Burmese population.”7 Since the sanctions that were enacted with the 8888 uprising 
by the military coup originated from human rights problems, the process of easing those 
sanctions would be a good indicator of the relationship.8  
Second, another line of research regarding the U.S.–Myanmar relationship 
examines competition between the United States and China. From Myanmar’s 
perspective, China is not necessarily friendly any more. President Thein Sein worried 
about Myanmar’s gradual subordination to China.9 At the same time, the Myanmarese 
thought that Beijing neglected the conservation of the regional society of Myanmar and 
pushes emigrants around. Therefore, Naypyidaw concluded that one of the ways to 
resolve these problems was through normalization with Western society and 
                                                 
5 David I. Steinberg, “The United States and Myanmar: A ‘Boutique Issue’?” International Affairs 86, 
no. 1 (2010): 177. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00874.x. 
6 David I. Steinberg, “Burma/Myanmar and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 21, no. 2 (1999b): 283. 
7 Leon T. Hadar, “Burma: U.S. Foreign Policy as Morality Play,” Journal of International Affairs 54, 
no. 2 (Spring 2001): 411. 
8 Norman G. Owen, The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaiʻi Press, 2005), 504. The 8888 uprising was a democratic contention that occurred on August 8, 
1988 in Yangon. 
9 Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar’s China Policy since 1948 (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 131. 
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democratization and reform.10 From the United States perspective, China was a potential 
challenger that wanted to become a hegemon after the end of the Cold War. Thus, the 
Obama administration proposed the Asia Rebalance Policy to check and block a rising 
China. Geographically, Myanmar would provide China access to the Indian Ocean 
without passing through the Strait of Malacca. 11  For these reasons, improving the 
relationship between the United States and Myanmar enhanced the U.S. strategic 
position.12  
These are examples of recent studies that pay attention to the practical context of 
foreign policy and put less weight on the effects of the level of authoritarianism on the 
relationship between states. 
b. Vietnam 
On May 23, President Obama announced fully lifting the embargo in Vietnam.13 
A study on the U.S.–Vietnam relationship can be roughly categorized into three sections: 
1) economic ties, 2) strategic ties, and 3) human rights. First, economic ties 
conspicuously demonstrate the U.S.–Vietnam relationship. Both states made significant 
efforts to create an interest in the Asia Pacific region through the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement negotiations.14 Also, foreign direct investment – 
the inward and outward flow investment and stock – has gradually increased since 
2007.15 Even though the United States incessantly urged action on human rights, U.S. 
economic ties continuously developed. In this context, what is the correlation between 
                                                 
10 Jun Young Jang, “Changes and Challenges of Myanmar-China Relations: Balance of Power and 
Strategic Hedging,” Southeast Asian Research 24, no. 3 (2014): 96. 
11 Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw, 106. 
12 Staff Report, “Myanmar and the U.S.: Stumbling Toward a Critical Relationship,” Defense & 
Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Policy, January 2013, 1. 
13 Gardiner Harris, “Vietnam Arms Embargo to be Fully Lifted, Obama Says in Hanoi,” New York 
Times, May 23, 2016. 
14 Mark E. Manyin, U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2014: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy 
(CRS Report No. R40208) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1. 
15 “UNCTADstat - Table View - Foreign Direct Investment: Inward and Outward Flows and Stock, 
Annual, 1980–2014,” accessed May 12, 2016, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/
tableView.aspx. 
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human rights. which are the basis of democracy. and economic interests that represent a 
pragmatic approach? 
Second, another study of the U.S.–Vietnam relationship is an analysis of strategic 
ties. After the Cold War, despite no change in Vietnam’s regime, U.S.–Vietnam relations 
share issues for strategic gains. From the Vietnamese position, checking the Chinese 
military threat is needed. From the U.S. position, reconciling the fates of soldiers missing 
in action is an additional issue.16 After the normalization of relations in 1995, the United 
States and Vietnam steadily increased their strategic relationship according to 
international circumstances. Especially concerned about a rising China in the middle of 
the 2000s, the  United States and Vietnam shared a common strategic interest—the South 
China Sea territorial dispute between China and Vietnam and the competition for regional 
hegemony between the United States and China. In 2013, the United States and Vietnam 
announced a “comprehensive partnership,” which shared concerns regarding China.17  
In this manner, most research studies observe other aspects of U.S.–Vietnam 
relations. Thus, measuring the impact of the level of authoritarianism in this relationship 
will be meaningful to better understanding the full range of factors driving the 
relationship.  
c. North Korea  
Most studies on the U.S.–North Korea relationship focus on illicit activities, 
especially nuclear proliferation. Since North Korea has continuously and directly 
threatened the United States, the priority of the relationship between them cannot help 
focusing on military issues. Another study concerning their relationship takes note of 
economic sanctions. As a result of North Korea’s unreasonable activities, the United 
Nations imposed diverse sanctions. On this point, some scholars argue that economic 
sanctions can change the stance of North Korea. Others contend that economic sanctions 
                                                 
16 John William Jr Little, “Vietnam in U.S. Foreign Policy: An Association for the Strategic Balance 
in Southeast Asia” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1991), 120, 124, 130. 
17 Manyin, U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2014: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy (CRS 
Report No. R40208), 1 
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are not enough to change the direction of North Korea. Studies typically do not 
concentrate on authoritarianism as a factor in the U.S.–North Korea relationship.  
First, scholars take note of the nuclear weapons program when analyzing the 
U.S.–North Korea relationship. Since the 1990s, Pyongyang began developing nuclear 
weapons. The United States has aimed for North Korea’s denuclearization through 
bilateral or multilateral negotiation, but North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests–in 
2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016–and a series of long-range missile or rocket launches since 
1998.18 One study, U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula, introduces four U.S. policy 
options regarding the nuclear issue: acquiescence, manage and contain, rollback, and 
regime change.19 At the end of the study, the research contends that denuclearizing is the 
purpose that the United States should continuously pursue. Victor D. Cha and David 
Kang, who are North Korea experts, also deal with the nuclear issues of North Korea and 
argue that the United States should engage more actively after the first North Korean 
nuclear test.20 In the same vein, Taehyung Ahn also suggests that U.S. policy should 
abandon the “strategic patience” and apply “constructive engagement.” 21  Given that 
North Korea consistently threatens regional security, concerns should focus on nuclear 
weapons, and matters of authoritarianism should take a back seat.  
Second, the article North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions 
illustrates the U.S.–North Korea relationship. The author argues that, on account of North 
Korea’s diverse activities, U.S. economic sanctions bring about “minimal trade and 
                                                 
18 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, North Korea: U.S. Relations, 
Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation (CRS Report No. R41259) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2016), 1. 
19 Charles L. Pritchard, Scott A. Snyder and John H. Tilelli, U. S. Policy Toward the Korean 
Peninsula: Independent Task Force Report (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2014), 11. 
20 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 11. 
21 Taehyung Ahn, “Patience Or Lethargy?: U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Under the Obama 
Administration,” North Korean Review 8, no. 1 (2012), 1. doi://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.3172/
NKR.8.1.67. 
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foreign aid, arms sales and transfer, barrier of assets.”22 Then, the author highlights the 
role of the U.S. Congress. Even though the President leads foreign policy, Congress holds 
the authority related to the appropriation of the budget that enables the policy according 
to U.S. “political and strategic interests.”23 Thus, the U.S.–North Korea relationship is a 
reflection of the legislative action of the U.S. Congress. In short, these sorts of studies 
concentrate on comprehensive North Korean activities and the U.S. relationship.  
Evaluating the role of authoritarianism in the U.S.–North Korea relationship is 
more difficult than in the Vietnam and Myanmar cases because, unlike those cases, North 
Korean totalitarianism has been stark and unyielding. That reality likely explains the 
relative absence of attention to this topic in the literature on U.S.–North Korea relations. 
However, the common mention in many analyses of how “regime change” in North 
Korea might transform the relationship indicates the potentially important role that 
unwavering authoritarianism plays in keeping that relationship frozen. This thesis will 
seek to evaluate that role. 
3. About Authoritarianism 
This section of the literature review discusses types of authoritarianism and 
criteria for gauging authoritarianism.  
a. Broad Classification 
Before dealing with the degree of softening authoritarianism, the concept of 
authoritarianism must be defined and classified by level. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, 
who revised the classification of authoritarianism from tri-partite to penta-partite, argue 
that “The existing tripartite regime classification has not only become less useful to 
                                                 
22 Dianne E. Rennack, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions (CRS Report No. 
R41438) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 1. The activities include weapons 
proliferation, regional disruptions, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, undemocratic governance, and illicit 
activities in international markets, including money laundering, counterfeiting of goods and currency, and 
bulk cash smuggling.  
23 Ibid. 
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democratic theorists and practitioners than it once was, it has also become an obstacle.”24 
Hence, Linz and Stepan reformulated the regime classification as follows: democratic, 
totalitarian, authoritarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic regime. Also, the authors 
elaborate the concept of the newly proposed classifications by comparing four 
characteristics: pluralism, ideology, mobilization, and leadership.  
At this point, defining totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism is needed. Linz and 
Stepan list characteristics of totalitarianism as follows: 
 If a regime has eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic, and 
social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideology, has 
intensive and extensive mobilization, and has a leadership that rules, often 
charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and 
vulnerability for elites and non-elites alike, then it seems to us that it still 
makes historical and conceptual sense to call this a regime with strong 
totalitarian tendencies.25 
The authors also derive another typology, post-totalitarianism, and highlight 
differences compared to other types of regimes. One of the features of post-
totalitarianism is “restricted pluralism.”26 It might have a second economy and a parallel 
society; whereas totalitarianism has an economy planned by the state and recognizes state 
led organizations or groups only.27 Another difference of post-totalitarianism compared 
to totalitarianism is the degree of emphasis on ideology. Whereas totalitarianism 
emphasizes a “holistic conception of humanity and society,” post-totalitarianism 
underscores “programmatic consensus.”28 In mobilization, totalitarianism does not care 
about the private life of people, while post-totalitarianism has reduced the frequency of 
mobilization to an individual: the leader. The last difference is adopting an “internal 
democracy” in order for the leader to avoid security problems.  
                                                 
24 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, “Modern Non-Democratic Regimes,” in Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 39. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
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One advantage of Linz and Stepan’s research outcome is that the readers can 
easily apply the typology to contemporary states. On the other hand, not all states fit the 
characteristic criteria neatly, making it hard to determine exactly where the political 
systems of some states fit within the criteria.  
b. Competitive Authoritarianism 
In the post-Cold War era, the types of political systems were not limited to 
democracy, authoritarian, and totalitarian. Various sorts of political systems fell in the 
gray area between democracy and authoritarianism. In this context in 2002, Steven 
Levitsky and Lucan Way introduced the notion of competitive authoritarianism, which 
compared full-scale authoritarianism to full-scale democracy. Competitive 
authoritarianism is located midway between these political systems. As Linz and Stepan 
mentioned, Levitsky and Way also agreed with the need to recognize hybrid political 
systems to characterize many contemporary states, especially in the post-Cold War era. 
Approximately a decade later, the authors explained competitive authoritarianism in 
more detail in their book, and they complement the research and define the notion 
explicitly, as follows.  
Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal 
democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means 
of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state place them 
at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are 
competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest 
seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field 
is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but 
unfair.29  
 
Then, the authors compare democratic, competitive authoritarianism, and full 
authoritarian by three criteria: the “status of core democratic institutions (elections, civil 
liberties),” the “status of opposition,” and the “level of uncertainty.”30 Levitsky and Way 
emphasize the meaning of this newly designed subtype of authoritarianism: “Competitive 
                                                 
29 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold 
War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5. 
30 Ibid., 13. 
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authoritarianism does not easily fit existing subtypes of authoritarianism in large part 
because these regimes are noncompetitive.” 31  For this reason, Levitsky and Way’s 
argument can offer a good criterion to classify the level of hybrid authoritarianism. By 
adding competitive authoritarianism to the pre-existing typology, the reader can analyze 
authoritarian states more precisely. 
c. Democratic Authoritarianism 
Similar to competitive authoritarianism, democratic authoritarianism also pays 
attention to the democratic components in the authoritarian regime, especially institutions. 
Examples include parties and elections. 32  Dawn Brancati, suggests that democratic 
authoritarianism uses institutions nominally so as to “strengthen authoritarian regime” 
and “forestall democratization.” 33  Authoritarian regimes employ five mechanisms to 
protect their regimes: “signaling, information acquisition, patronage distribution, credible 
commitment, and monitoring.”34 The problem with this article, in the overall perspective, 
is that the border between competitive authoritarianism and democratic authoritarianism 
is vague. These concepts might need to be merged or explicitly separated.  
d. Sultanism 
Another description of an authoritarian regime is sultanism, which is already dealt 
with in Linz and Stepan’s work. In Linz and Stepan’s article, the authors quote Weber’s 
description, “Sultanism tends to arise whenever traditional domination develops an 
administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master…. 
Where domination … operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called 
sultanism.”35 In addition, the authors state, “The essence of sultanism is unrestrained 
personal rulership. This personal rulership is unconstrained by ideology, rational-legal 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 15. 
32 Dawn Brancati, “Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 17, no. 1 (2014): 314. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052013-115248. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Linz and Stepan, Modern Non-Democratic Regimes, 51. 
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norms, or any balance of power.” That means the most important factor when governing 
the state is just personal presence.  
Jason Brownlee concentrates on another aspect of sultanism. The author pays 
attention to the process of power succession within sultanism because he thinks, 
“Hereditary succession among republic-style autocracies was unheralded by earlier 
studies of authoritarianism and remains unexplained in the hybrid regimes literature.”36 
The author analyzes 258 autocrats in post-World War II who ruled for more than three 
years, and he examines a correlation among party, dictators, and successor. In the end, 
Brownlee concludes, “Sons will succeed fathers whose power predates the party’s.”37 
The author insists that sultanism is distinct from other types of authoritarianism, with 
different features from the existing typology.  
e. One-Party Rule 
Similar to other types of regimes, one characteristic to classify an authoritarian 
regime is one-party rule. Benjamin Smith describes characteristics of one-party rule and 
initial conditions for the consolidation of authoritarianism. Then, the author argues, 
“Authoritarianism ought to do so judiciously, investigating not only the institutional 
appearances of regime types but also their social and political underpinnings.”38 One of 
largest countries with one-party rule is China, which at the present time is perhaps the 
most important country after the United States.  
The other works of Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Krecheli describe the one-party 
regime as the most commonplace and stable type of authoritarianism.39 The authors raise 
questions, including “Why are one-party dictatorships more stable than are others? Why 
do they grow more and experience fewer violent threats?” Then they suggest four points: 
1) autocrats’ capability to survive challenges from both other elites and masses, 2) the 
                                                 
36 Jason Brownlee, “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies,” World Politics 59, no. 4 (2007), 
595. 
37 Ibid., 628. 
38 Benjamin Smith, “Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under 
Single-Party Rule,” World Politics 57, no. 3 (2005): 429. 
39 Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli, “Political Order and One-Party Rule,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 13, no. 1 (05/01; 2016/05, 2010): 123. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220529. 
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regime’s ability to survive unchanged, 3) the difference between electoral 
authoritarianism and democracy, and 4) international forces that diffuse the single-party 
rule.40 At the end of the research, they do not solve the question, even though they found 
some characteristics of one-party rule.  
As the authors said, one-party rule provides the most stable authoritarian regime 
and is the most prevalent type at the present time, but many questions remain unanswered. 
In tandem with researching one-party rule, studying “global forces” that affect the one-
party rule’s decision is also necessary. 41  Thus, one-party rule is a definite type of 
authoritarian regime, which should be involved in the research range of authoritarianism. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The literature review summarizes information about authoritarianism and the U.S. 
relationships with the three states of concern in this thesis; however, former studies have 
not directly demonstrated the influence of authoritarianism on these relationships. To 
investigate that linkage, this thesis examines how the level of authoritarianism in other 
countries affects the U.S. relationship with those countries. The independent variable is 
the level of authoritarianism in a state, and the dependent variable is the U.S. relationship 
with that state.  
The thesis evaluates the hypothesis that countries with low levels of 
authoritarianism are more likely to have a good relationship with the United States than 
countries with high levels of authoritarianism. If the research finds that a low level of 
authoritarianism is associated with a good U.S. relationship with the opposite state, the 
analysis will further examine whether changes in authoritarianism precede or follow 
changes in U.S. relations. On this basis, the thesis will seek to develop explanations for 
the relationship.  
Alternatively, if the research finds that there is no relation between 
authoritarianism and the U.S. relationships with Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea, 
the analysis will examine why other reasons may outrank the value of democracy. 




Despite the United States considering democracy as essential, other specific issues or 
strategic circumstances may outrank the value of democracy. Analyzing these situations 
will provide a good standard and prioritize the values in various environments. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The methodology of this paper employs statistical analysis and comparative case 
studies. With proxy scales that indicate the softening of authoritarianism and the U.S. 
relationship with three states, the thesis can accurately depict the relationship and acquire 
persuasive power. The selection of the three states rather than one has the effect of 
reduces the possibility of leaning to one side; also, the selection improves credibility.  
The states—Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea—in the Asia-Pacific region are 
important based on the “Rebalancing to Asia” policy of the United States. Among them, 
Southeast Asia has been famous for sustaining authoritarian regimes, and North Korea, 
needless to say, is notorious as a rogue state. By comparing these three cases, the research 
can approach the prime concern of the United States. Consequently, these methodologies 
provide empirical evidence. 
1. Quantify the Independent Variable 
First of all, to measure the level of authoritarianism, the thesis uses the level of 
freedom, which is offered by the Freedom House organization.42 The scales represent the 
degree of freedom. Political rights and civil liberties determine the freedom rating, 
expressed as a seven-point scale, from one (most free) to seven (least free), and in this 
thesis, the proxy scale is applied inversely for intuitive understanding: from one (least 
free) to seven (most free). The thesis utilizes the scales from the years of 1975 to 2016. 
By doing so, the independent variable becomes visible; and the thesis finds the inflection 
points and analyzes them, which indicates meaningful points of change.  
                                                 
42 “Freedom in the World,” Freedom House, accessed May 13, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/freedom-world-2016. 
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Freedom House provides an annual report on the freedom rate of each state based 
on both political rights and civil liberties.43 By examining the countries using the same 
standard, students can compare each state’s level of freedom rating and trace a specific 
state’s variation. Freedom House proposes that political rights are determined by three 
subcategories: 1) “electoral process,” 2) “political pluralism and participation,” and 3) 
“functioning of government.” 44 Each category has multiple questions that define the 
specific country’s status.45 The civil liberties also have subcategories, which contain 1) 
“freedom of expression and belief,” 2) “associational and organizational rights,” 3) “rule 
of law,” and 4) “personal autonomy and individual rights,” and each subcategory also has 
several questions.46 The paper also concentrates on the aformentioned standards for the 
analysis of specific points. Freedom House produced the numerical rating with an in-
house team and external analysts. Approximately 110 experts participated in the 2016 
edition, and they used a diverse range of sources. That means the freedom rating has 
good validity to measure the level of authoritarianism as a proxy scale.  
2. Quantify the Dependent Variable 
To measure the U.S. relationship with Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea, the 
thesis uses proxy scales that can represent the relationship: political ties, economic ties, 
and military ties. First, to measure the political ties, the thesis uses the number of visits of 
national guests and the existence of an embassy. In the number of visits of national 
guests, the thesis adds the number of visits by the U.S. President and the U.S. Secretary 
of State and the number of visits by foreign leaders to the United States. Plus, the 
existence of an embassy represents the relationship between states. The meaning of 
national guest visits is broad, but generally it represents the significance of the 
relationship between two states. The degree is expressed numerically from one to seven 
like the scale of the freedom rating.  






Second, to measure economic ties, the thesis uses the sum of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Myanmar’s case and the sum of the amount of trade volume in the 
cases of Vietnam and North Korea. Each case does not have enough information from 
1975 to 2016, thus a different proxy scale is used. To fill this gap, the thesis is paired 
with the qualitative analysis. FDI reflects appropriate economic ties, including 
psychological aspects of investors. The sum of trade volume also well expresses the 
outcome of the economic relations. Even though the proxy comes from different indexes, 
both proxies have no problems showing the economic ties. The economic ties range from 
one to seven.  
Third, to measure military ties, the thesis uses the changing amounts of military 
assistance, which is provided annually by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID).47 The statistics show the sum of aid and stand for the formal institutionalized 
extent to which the United States and related states cooperate. Since the United States 
employs budget depending on priority, the variation in the sums represents the 
significance of the relationship. The military ties also range from one to seven. 
3. Analyze the Correlation 
After the creation of proxy scales, the thesis compares and analyzes the 
correlation between the level of authoritarianism and U.S. relations—political, economic, 
and military ties—with Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea. If the proxy and context of 
their ties would not explain the correlation, the thesis will further investigate the reason 
for U.S. relations with opposite states beyond the authoritarianism explanation. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Following the introduction (Chapter I), Chapters II and III explain the cases of 
Myanmar and Vietnam, respectively. Each case study defines the state’s regime type 
based on the characteristics of authoritarianism and analyzes the correlation between the 
level of authoritarianism and relations between the United States and each of the two 
countries, Myanmar and Vietnam. Then, each chapter makes a conclusion about each 
                                                 
47 “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 
30, 2014,” USAID, accessed May 12, 2016, https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports-greenbook.html. 
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state. In Chapter IV, the thesis compares the cases of Myanmar and Vietnam and 
concludes with the findings in this research. Additionally, the chapter examines the North 
Korea case briefly. Finally, the thesis outlines the relevance, importance, and limitations 
of the work, and presents opportunities for future research.  
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II. THE CASE OF MYANMAR 
For the purpose of this thesis, this chapter investigates how much authoritarianism 
helps to explain U.S. foreign policy in the Myanmar case. It is going to look in detail at 
the Freedom House ranking in relation to authoritarianism in Myanmar. Then, the chapter 
examines how U.S. foreign policy has evolved in history in terms of these three 
variables—political, economic, and military ties—and how much authoritarianism 
affected these relations. At the end, the chapter considers the strength of these 
correlations and what it says about cause and characteristic The analysis also looks at 
strategic factors as a potential explanation for the lack of correlation in these variables. In 
the case of Myanmar, these factors could include 1) the level of authoritarianism, 2) the 
correlation between authoritarianism and U.S. relations with Myanmar, 3) the 
explanation beyond the authoritarianism, and 4) the conclusion.  
In the first section, the thesis traces the variation of authoritarianism from 1975 to 
2016 and explains the reason why the deviated inflection occurred at that time. In the 
second section, the correlation between authoritarianism and U.S. relations with 
Myanmar are analyzed in terms of political, economic, and military ties. The third section 
investigates the reasons for the absence of correlation between two variables. The section 
includes the causal direction, which reflects the comprehensive analysis of 
authoritarianism and U.S.–Myanmar overall ties: political, economic, and military. 
Furthermore, the discussion regarding strategic circumstances illuminates the context of 
the U.S.–Myanmar relationship with respect to strategic interests that provide potential 
explanations for aspects that could not be explained by the authoritarian factor. Finally, 
the conclusion section synthesizes U.S. foreign policy toward Myanmar. 
A. LEVEL OF AUTHORITARIANISM 
Myanmar is a country in a dynamic regime transition these days. Right after 
independence in 1948, Myanmar operated as a parliamentary system, which was unruly. 
General Ne Win staged a coup in 1962, and began the long journey of the military junta. 
Under Ne Win’s misrule, Myanmar’s overall capacity gradually decreased, and that led 
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the people to rebellion and another coup. In the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC)/State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) era, pluralism was regarded as a 
threat that would harm solidarity of the state.48 The military suppressed the ethnic and 
religious minorities. The famous example is the Rohingya Muslim community, which 
differs from Burman Buddhists.49 In the political arena, the military rebuffed the result of 
the general election in 1990. General elections held in 2010 and 2015 were more free and 
fair, but also excluded minority groups. Nevertheless, the degree of authoritarianism 
gradually decreased. 
The Myanmarese level of authoritarianism had seven inflection points that have 
sharply changed in research periods: 1978, 1983, 1988, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016. 
Myanmar had suffered from a military junta since 1962 because of the military coup by 
General Ne Win. Meanwhile, the freedom of Myanmar gradually decreased: no elections 
took place; no pluralism for religious or ethnic groups was allowed; Burmese Ways to 
Socialism became mandatory; and industries became nationalized. Even though 
Myanmar established bicameralism in 1948 and achieved independence from the British, 
political rights and civil liberties went from bad to worse.  
Ne Win’s Burmese Ways to Socialism, which pursued harmony between 
socialism and Burmese Buddhism, exacerbated the economic situation, and thus it was 
proved to be an illusion. In 1988, the 8888 uprising occurred in Rangoon University to 
protest these policy failures. Students, monks, and many people protested against the 
government, and civil liberties were suppressed as a result of the protest. General Saw 
Maung, however, staged a coup and brutally mistreated the people, and the freedom 
rating was degraded again in 1989. 
In 1990, the military junta held a general election with the judgment that the 
military party could win and earn legitimacy through the election, but the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) defeated the SLORC. Even though the SLORC was sure 
of itself at the election, it reacted to defeat by refusing to accept the results. Because of 
                                                 
48 David I. Steinberg, “Burma/Myanmar and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 21, no. 2 (Aug, 1999a): 292–3. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798457. 
49 Ibid., 293. 
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this action, the military ignored the democratic procedure, and the level of 
authoritarianism did not change despite the general election.  
In 2010, a general election took place for the first time in two decades. Through 
the solidarity of a quasi-military party’s victory, the Union Solidarity and Development 
Party (USDP) wanted to invalidate the 1990 general election. But the main opposition 
party, the NLD, had a politician who was branded as a political prisoner, including the 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and was not allowed to participate in the election. Furthermore, 
the election did not admit participation of specific ethnic minorities, such as the Rohingya, 
most of whom are Muslims. For this reason, the general election in 2010 could not 
develop political rights despite their implementation over the previous two decades in 
Myanmar.  
In 2011, the parliament recognized the human rights issue for the first time in 
decades, and some lawmakers ultimately created the Myanmar National Human Rights 
Commission. 50  Also, the government released political prisoners several times, and 
Myanmar’s Ministry of Information stopped inspections of all publications.51 President 
Thein Sein ordered the Commander-in-Chief General to stop aggressive operations on the 
Kachin Independence Army and instructed the ceasefire.52 The parliament held a by-
election, and the NLD participated in 2012.53 In this manner, the Myanmar government 
made an effort to enhance political rights and civil liberties. In 2015, the general election 
resulted in a win by the NLD, and the first civilian government was established since 
1962. 
This evolution of authoritarianism in Myanmar is well represented by the 
Freedom House ratings over this period, depicted in Figure 1. 
                                                 
50 “Freedom in the World,”; Michael F. Martin, Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions (CRS 
Report No. R42363) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013a). 
51 Ibid., 37. 
52 Ibid., 38. 
53 Ibid.; “Freedom in the World.”  
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Figure 1.  Variation of freedom rating in Myanmar54 
 
B. CORRELATION BETWEEN AUTHORITARIANISM AND U.S. 
RELATIONS WITH MYANMAR 
The variation of U.S.–Myanmar relations is made up of political, economic, and 
military ties. The extent of each tie is illustrated with a graph. Political ties involve 
components, such as the existence of an ambassador and the number of national summit 
visits. Economic ties are defined by the amount of FDI. Military ties are expressed by the 
amount of military aid from the United States. Because the proxy index could not include 
a comprehensive assessment, qualitative analysis is added in following paragraph. 
1. Political Ties 
The U.S.–Myanmar political ties consist of both summit visits and the presence of 
the ambassador. Table 1 shows both countries’ summit travel to the other state. The 
United States contains the Secretary of State category, which is regarded as summit level, 
and Myanmar also contains the visit of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is the de facto leader of 
Myanmar. The presence of the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar has a symbolic meaning, 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
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insofar as both states have diplomatic relations within normal channels. From 1990 to 
2012, U.S. chargés d’affaires had substituted for the mission of the ambassador. 
Table 1.   U.S.–Myanmar summit visits55 
 
For the first time in almost six decades—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
visited Myanmar in 1955—Secretary Clinton visited Myanmar in 2011. She met with 
President Thein Sein, who was the former military authority and now the reformer of the 
Myanmarese regime, and Aung San Suu Kyi, who was epitome of the Myanmarese 
democratic journey. President Barack Obama also mentioned that the Secretary trip was 
part of the policy, U.S. Rebalancing in Asia. 56  In this context, the trip could be 
interpreted as a point of contact between U.S. foreign policy to broader engagement in 
the Asia-Pacific region and promotion of support for democratic reform, as the United 
States always emphasized. 
In 2012, President Obama visited Myanmar for the first time in U.S. presidential 
history. He visited Rangoon University and exhibited the U.S. inclination to support 
Myanmarese innovation, saying that “I’ve come to keep my promise and extend the hand 
                                                 
55 “Burma - Visits by Foreign Heads of States,” accessed May 10, 2016, https://history.state.gov/
departmenthistory/visits; “Burma - Travels of the Secretary of State,” accessed May 10, 2016, 
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/secretary/burma.; “Burma - Travels of the President,” 
accessed May 10, 2016, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/burma. 
56 Jason Burke, “Hillary Clinton Begins Burma Visit,” Guardian, last modified November 30, 2011, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/30/hillary-clinton-burma-visit-reform-hopes. 
State Date Name 
The United States 
September 30–December 2, 2011 Hillary Clinton 
November 19, 2012 Barack Obama 
November 19, 2012 Hillary Clinton 
August 9–10, 2014 John Kerry 
November 12–14, 2014 Barack Obama 
May 22, 2016 John Kerry 
Myanmar 
May 19–21, 2013 Thein Sein 
September 14–15, 2016 Dew Aung San Suu Kyi 
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of friendship.” 57  In 2013, President Thein Sein visited Washington, the first time a 
Myanmarese president had done so since 1966. 58  President Thein Sein talked with 
President Obama regarding the ongoing transformation, sharing the necessities to do 
more work for democracy, and appealing to “the assistance and understanding of the 
international community.”59 In 2014, President Obama went to Myanmar to attend the 
East Asian Summit plenary and the U.S.–ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations ) session. During this travel, President Obama discussed the role of Parliament in 
reform with members of the Myanmarese Parliament and civil society.60 Of course, he 
met with President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi, and he said that “There is a need 
for a stronger rule of law, for elections that are free, fair and inclusive, and for continued 
constitutional changes that will move Burma more fully towards a civilian 
government.” 61  Through several meetings between the summits, their political and 
diplomatic ties increasingly developed. In this way, both presidents created historical 
moments, clearing the legacy of the old days. 
After the launch of democratic reform, the Secretary of State played a role to 
advance the transition. Different from the summit-level meeting, Secretary John Kerry 
dealt with the specific issue more concretely. In 2014, Secretary Kerry visited Myanmar 
to attend several ministerial meetings, such as the East Asia Summit, U.S.–ASEAN, the 
Lower Mekong Initiative, Friends of the Lower Mekong Initiative, and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum.62 During his second visit in 2016, he praised the inauguration of the 
first civilian government and addressed the ethnic minority, Rohingya issues, the role of 
                                                 
57 “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Yangon,” The White House, last modified 
November 19, 2012, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/19/remarks-president-obama-
university-yangon. 
58 Ewen MacAskill, “Thein Sein Becomes First Burmese President to Visit U.S. since 1966,” 
Guardian, last modified May 20, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/20/thein-sein-
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59 Ibid. 
60 “The President’s Trip to China, Burma and Australia | the White House,” The White House, 
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 25 
the military in politics, and the nuclear program with North Korea.63 Then, the Secretary 
expressed his satisfaction with Myanmar’s steps on North Korean issues. 64  U.S.–
Myanmarese political ties have increased after President Obama announced his grand 
policy, “Pivot to Asia.” He created the agenda regarding U.S. foreign policy in his tenure, 
and the overall approach to Myanmar’s policy extended the “Pivot to Asia.”  
Political ties closely resemble the freedom rating of Myanmar in Figure 1. In 
1989, the degree of ties fell from four to one. Then in 2011, it went up again, and in 2012 
and 2014, it recorded the highest level. First of all, in 1988–1990, as a result of the 8888 
uprising, in which the military suppressed the peaceful pro-democracy demonstration 
with an indiscriminate use of force, Aung San Suu Kyi was under house arrest by the 
government: the military junta.65 Then, General Saw Maung and Brigadier General Khin 
Nyunt formed a party, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).66 The 
promised elections in September 1988 did not take place, so Myanmarese political rights 
decreased at that time.67   
Even though in 1990 the SLORC held an election to solidify the SLORC’s base 
and win legitimacy from the people, they barred Aung San Suu Kyi from attending an 
election as a candidate, since she had a British family member and had been arrested for 
antigovernment demonstrations in 1988.68 As a result, the SLORC rejected handing over 
power to the NLD to form a new government and constitution.69 After that, from 1990 to 
2011, the political ties measured almost zero. To check political regression in Myanmar, 
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the U.S. government degraded the status of diplomatic representation to charge d’affaires, 
which has a lower diplomatic rank than ambassador.70  
Additionally, the United States stopped assistance programs and blocked 
economic trade with Myanmar in the international arena. Visa restrictions on 
Myanmarese officials and families also were imposed.71 In the international domain, the 
United States exerted its political power to suppress Myanmar’s international position, 
such as its relationship with the ASEAN and the European Union (EU).72 As the United 
States intended, Myanmar could not exercise political leverage, and the EU imposed 
economic sanctions against Myanmar, involving the “arms embargo” and “visa 
restrictions.”73 In Congress, a bipartisan coalition isolated the Myanmar regime through 
“resolutions, amendments, and bills.”74  
Since 2011, the U.S.–Myanmar relationship entered a new phase. After President 
Thein Sein took power, Myanmarese political rights improved through various actions. 
On January 5, 2012, the Myanmarese government amended the law regarding party 
registration in order for Suu Kyi to run for election; in addition, the government set free 
political prisoners. 75 Through these political advancements, Myanmarese citizens and 
parties could see future possibilities. 76  In return for these improvements, the EU 
suspended most sanctions.77  
The United States also improved relations, but in a measured fashion. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton and President Obama visited Myanmar, but during his visit 
President Obama cited “prisoners of conscience” issues in pushing for more improvement 
of political rights.78 These overtures happened in what Martin calls an “action-for-action” 
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72 Ibid. 
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strategy, which was a reactive and prudent strategy that ensured progress.79 Eventually, 
President Obama announced that the United States and Myanmar would normalize the 
diplomatic relationship by raising the status of representative to that of an ambassador.80  
In 2013, President Thein Sein visited the United States for a working visit. 
President Thein Sein discussed various issues with President Obama.81 In the conference, 
they shared the status quo and a blueprint regarding the reform of Myanmar. For example, 
President Thein Sein revealed some issues: political prisoners, institutionalization of 
political reforms, and ethnic conflicts. President Obama responded with Muslim 
communities’ problems, USAID, and the U.S. role in ASEAN in refocusing the Asia 
Pacific region.82As a result in 2014, President Obama visited the U.S.–ASEAN Mekong 
Initiative, the Regional forum, and the East Asia Summit (EAS) meeting in Myanmar. 
Overall, both political ties and the level of authoritarianism have a correlation. 
Generally, Figure 2 shows that political ties preceded the changes in the level of 
authoritarianism by taking an action to facilitate the progress of authoritarianism. Based 
on signs of potential reform in the Myanmarese political regime, such as the 2008 
amendment and the 2010 general election, the United States seized the opportunity to 
promote the dynamics of democratic transition. This engagement proceeded with an 
“action-for-action” strategy.83 After the launch of democratic transition, its political ties 
and softening authoritarianism created a synergistic effect, without the assessment of who 
triggered the transition. 
This evolution of U.S.–Myanmar political ties is rated and depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  U.S.–Myanmar political ties84 
 
2. Economic Ties 
Economic ties reflect FDI amounts from 1975 to 2014. The amounts calculated on 
a seven-point scale are easy to compare with the level of authoritarianism. The economic 
ties change with the imposition of economic sanctions. One surprising finding is that FDI 
amounts used to increase whenever the United States added sanctions. This is because 
businesses invested in Myanmar before the sanctions came into effect. Even though that 
fluctuation was just temporary, the business relations differed because of the political 
stance, especially in 1997 and 2003. Other than these cases, 2007 and 2008 sanctions also 
created a fluctuation in FDI amounts.  
The United States began an economic sanctions program in 1997 by reason of the 
“repression of democratic opposition.” 85  Through several periods, the United States 
strengthened the sanctions on the military junta and on the specific person who was 
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responsible for various violations of human rights. After the normalization of U.S.–
Myanmar relations, economic sanctions were eased, revising the sanctions step-by-step in 
2012, 2013, and 2014.86 Economic sanctions were the tool of an accelerating transition. 
On May 22, 2016, just before the sanction program ended, Secretary Kerry and State 
Counsellor Suu Kyi agreed with the opinion that U.S. sanctions would not be harmful if 
Myanmar pursued an honest and righteous.87 Before long, Present Obama ordered the 
termination of sanctions on October 7, 2016, for the first time in 20 years.88 
From 1975 to 2010, two sudden increases occurred, in 1997 and 2003. After the 
military coup in 1988, the United States had continuously condemned Myanmar and took 
actions to correct its brutal dictatorship. For example, Congress required the president to 
apply sanctions against Myanmar by passing the Customs and Trade Act. Furthermore, in 
1992, the Senate withheld the nomination of an ambassador to Myanmar.89 In 1995 and 
1996, Congress tried to pass severe restrictions on Myanmar, but President Bill Clinton 
deferred his decision. 90  In 1997, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act was 
amended by the Feinstein-Cohen Act, which supported the President’s discretionary 
authority to sanction Burma.91 In this manner, the Clinton administration took various 
actions to dispatch a special envoy to Rangoon, and it brought about the release of 
political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.92  
Yet, Congress wanted to apply pressure through the Feinstein-Cohen amendment. 
Even though the President imposed a ban, supported by Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, sanctions generated little enthusiasm because of their effects on U.S. companies 
and the U.S.–ASEAN relationship. 93  As a result in 1997, foreign direct investment 
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temporarily increased because businesses anticipated that if a ban applied to new 
investments, they would lose an opportunity to invest in Myanmar. The White House 
excluded pre-existing investments as a concession to businesses.94 In the end, the amount 
of contracts totaled $339 million, or 16 times more than the sum of 1995 and 1996.95 
Eventually, FDI increased compared to previous years without economic sanctions.  
In 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi was rearrested, and the government suppressed Suu 
Kyi’s associates; as a result, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act became active.96 
In 2007 and 2008, the United States added sanctions because of the 2007 Saffron 
Revolution.97 Whenever the United States imposed sanctions, FDI increased as a reaction 
before the sanction took effect. In 2011, after the general election, the outlook that other 
countries expected Myanmar’s regime to change had grown. Consequently, FDI rose to 
an all-time high since 1975. In conclusion, the line between economic ties and 
authoritarianism blurred, except at a critical point such as in 2010 when the military junta 
transferred power to civilians.   
Figure 3 demonstrates that the variation in authoritarianism does not have much to 
do with economic ties. Rather, economic ties could reflect the economic sentiments of the 
investor, assessing the government’s economic policies. At times when the government 
imposed economic sanctions, foreign businesses rushed to invest in Myanmar before new 
sanctions came into force. Contrary to political goals, economic ties had the opposite 
effect before applying sanctions. The years 1997 and 2003 explicitly show the tendency 
that involved a preemptive investment by businesses. Nevertheless, expectations of 
democratic transition in Myanmar recorded the highest FDI amounts in 2010. This 
phenomenon demonstrates that a Myanmarese democratic transition could be favorable 
for the economic arena. Economic ties exhibit greater sensitivity in reactions by business 
because the businesses exist to seek profit and should respond with a comprehensive 
judgment that reflects future opportunities.  
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This evolution of U.S.–Myanmar political ties is scaled and depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  U.S.–Myanmar economic ties98 
 
3. Military Ties 
The military ties reflect the amounts of military assistance by the United States. 
Before the United States severed the connection with Myanmar in 1990, Myanmarese 
soldiers learned U.S. military principles through the International Military Education and 
Training (IMET).99 Also, the United States provided some light helicopters and transport 
aircrafts for the International Narcotics Control Program.100 From 1975 to 1982, the U.S. 
government supported Myanmarese police anti-narcotics operations, providing 28 
helicopters and 7 transport aircraft. The military-to-military ties were severed in 1988 
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because of the 8888 uprising. 101  After that, the U.S.–Myanmar military relationship 
almost did not exist, and the arms embargo continued. 102  In 2005, the Bush 
administration temporarily raised U.S. military assistance. The reason why the Bush 
administration abruptly raised the amount of military assistance was not clear, but at that 
time the U.S. government broadened its military ties with the Southeast Asia countries to 
conduct the war on terror.103 In this manner, the military ties have sustained without 
considerable change. 
After the restoration of a diplomatic relationship, the United States looked to 
improve the military-to-military relationship because Myanmar’s military, so far, has had 
considerable influence in Myanmar.104 President Obama urged the initiation of military-
to military dialogue even though Congress responded tepidly. When referring the 
Tatmadaw, the United States ambassador Derek Mitchell said, “We need to establish a 
regular dialogue, we need to get new ideas into that institution because they have been 
operating on old ideas that haven’t seemed to work very well for the country.”105 Also, 
Congress, which is conservative about the military-to-military ties, recognized that U.S. 
officials should engage in shaping Myanmar’s military outlook. 106  In this manner, 
understanding the significance of military-to-military cooperation has carefully increased 
after normalization.107 
Overall, Myanmarese authoritarianism and the military ties have no significant 
correlations. Despite the significance of military cooperation, the improvement of 
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military ties requires more time. Since the topic of military cooperation is sensitive to 
both countries, especially to Myanmar, which draws its identity in response to external 
threat, as it did during the colonial period and Cold War, enhancing military ties requires 
mutual understanding. 
This evolution of U.S.–Myanmar political ties is scaled and depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  U.S.–Myanmar military ties108 
 
C. EXPLANATION BEYOND AUTHORITARIANISM 
This section explains the reasons why the proxy scale does not include or exceed 
the authoritarianism perspective. The section consists of the 1) causal direction part, 
which illustrates the comprehensive correlation among four variables—the level of 
authoritarianism, U.S.–Myanmar political ties, economic ties, and military ties—and the 
factors that are not contained in the graph; and the 2) strategic background part follows 
that involves both states’ interests according to the passage of time. 
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1. Causal Direction 
So far, this chapter has examined the correlation between the level of 
authoritarianism and the U.S.–Myanmar relationship. In some cases, obvious correlation 
exists, and the others could not clearly show the correlation. In this section, the overall 
correlation among the four variables is investigated, not just the correlation between the 
level of authoritarianism and U.S.–Myanmar relations. Furthermore, it explains the part 
that the figure could not capture.  
First of all, in the explanation of political ties, Figure 2 shows that the level of 
authoritarianism follows the political ties. But, the thesis needs to revise this analysis 
because the problem is that the freedom rating could not express the intentions or 
triggers, which were subtle changes that became the huge bedrock of democratization. 
More specifically, the Myanmarese constitutional reform in 2008 was part of the Seven 
Step Roadmap to Democracy. Also, the general election in 2010 resulted in the military 
handing over its power to civilian government for the first time since 1962, albeit the 
leader Thein Sein was a former military man. Indeed, these movements became that the 
backdrop for Secretary of State Clinton’s visit in 2011. That means the United States 
acknowledged the possibility of the Myanmarese government’s transition to democracy, 
and it seized the opportunity to facilitate and support the transition procedure through 
political, institutional, and financial ways. In conclusion, a more detailed approach 
illustrates that political ties follow changes in authoritarianism. The freedom rating is a 
lagging indicator of those changes which also reflects reinforcement by U.S. 
reinforcement of early triggers and subtle changes. 
The second finding from the economic explanation is that businesses are sensitive 
to government economic policy and have the capability to read international 
circumstances. As the economic ties section has shown, the variation in U.S.–Myanmar 
economic ties was the outcome that came from the comprehensive assessment of the 
potential market. Something to notice here is what factors affect the assessment of 
businesses. First and foremost, governmental economic policy influenced the decision of 
businesses to invest in Myanmar. Examples include the sanctions in 1997 and 2003. The 
Clinton administration had exchanged its opinion about the economic sanctions by 
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Congress because President Clinton had a negative view of economic sanctions.109 In this 
process, the government determined the main target of sanctions would be new 
investments, and businesses decided to engage in preemptive investment before the 
sanctions became effective.  
Additionally, businesses have a capability to read the flow of the international 
situation. Although explicit economic policy did not exist in 2010, the year of the general 
election, the amount of FDI that year soared. This occurrence could be regarded as a sign 
that the business sector interpreted the Myanmarese election as having positive effects on 
the business environment. Even though the business investor would have had to pass 
complex procedures, which would authorize its status and might include a special tariff 
that could result in financial loss, the amount of FDI verified that these businesses 
thought the Myanmarese transition was a good sign of changes in the economic area. In 
these two instances, the conclusion can be drawn that the business sector responded 
sensitively to economic policy and future prospects, especially the factor that could 
influence the economic environment: authoritarianism in Myanmar. 
In the military sphere, the conservative Congress has responded cautiously, 
observing the transition more specifically. Also, Congress strictly influences military ties 
because of the significance directly linked to security issues. So far, military ties have 
undergone no critical changes in the U.S.–Myanmar relationship. Even though in 2005, 
military assistance temporarily rose, the degree—$3,842,000—was not significant. 
Military ties are made based on trustworthy evidence that could verify the transition, 
rather than as a prompt response to the potential change in authoritarianism. 
In conclusion, the changes in authoritarianism and political and economic ties 
have a strong and relatively nimble correlation. Political ties follow the initial change of 
authoritarianism and create interactions between each other. Economic ties preemptively 
respond right before the softening of authoritarianism, and military ties react 
conservatively, confirming the explicit changes. What is notable is the timing of how 
each tie responds with the variation in authoritarianism.  
109 Hadar, Burma: U.S. Foreign Policy as Morality Play, 416. 
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The evolution of U.S.–Myanmar ties is scaled and depicted in Figure 5. 
Figure 5.  U.S.–Myanmar relations with freedom rating110 
 
2. Strategic Background 
The strategic background traces both the United States’ and Myanmar’s strategic 
interests, considering the international situation. Then, this section looks at how strategic 
interests could complement the authoritarian explanation. 
a. U.S. Strategic Interests 
According to David Steinberg, who is a famous scholar of Myanmar, the United 
States thought of the Myanmar issue as a “boutique foreign policy”; that is, relatively 
small but substantially important because the Myanmar issues involve high moral values, 
like human rights or democracy, which are crucial interests of the United States.111 Even 
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though the high moral issues have been sustained since 1962, when General Ne Win took 
power, the priority of Myanmar to U.S. foreign policy has varied depending on the U.S. 
recognition of the situation. In this section, the strategic context is classified as follows: 
1) 1975–1988: Cold War system, 2) 1988–2011: promoting values, and 3) 2011–present: 
pivot to Asia.  
(1) Ideological War, 1975–1988 
In this period, the Cold War system shaped U.S. interests in Myanmar.112 First 
and foremost, U.S. interests were a geostrategic benefit. At that time, Myanmar was 
subject to concerns over the domino effect of socialism in Southeast Asia, so the United 
States paid attention to its the geostrategic location, which is located between China and 
India and the center of the ASEAN states.113 Also, the United States used to employ 
Myanmar as a place to intervene in the Chinese Civil War and support the 
Kuomintang.114 In this way, ideological conflicts all over the world also affected the 
region, especially after the Vietnam War. Another U.S. interest is the human rights issue. 
The United States provided a new road project to Mandalay, focusing on basic human 
needs until the coup occurred in 1988.115 Lastly, Myanmarese resources were the part of 
U.S. interests. Abundant natural resources, such as oil, gas, and gems, and a cheap 
workforce could become accessible to U.S. interests.116 Nevertheless, the geostrategic 
interest dominated U.S. foreign policy compared to the other factors in those days 
because of its lack of effectiveness.  
(2) Pursuit of Values, 1988–2011 
From 1988 to 2011, the United States focused on moral issues to protect human 
rights and to promote democracy. In 1988, Yangon University students started to protest, 
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criticizing the government’s poor policy, the Burmese Way to Socialism, which created 
catastrophic poverty in the nation. During the protests, General Saw Maung staged a 
coup, killing the people brutally. The United States severed foreign aid and imposed an 
arms embargo immediately, and then in 1997, added sanctions as punishment. In 2003, 
the U.S. Congress passed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 to draw a 
response from the SPDC, which consistently abused Myanmarese citizens.117  
Another crucial interest was promoting democracy. Even though the NLD won 
the election in 1990, the SPDC did not admit the outcome. The United States negotiated 
with the SPDC promising that if the SPDC handed over the regime to the NLD, honoring 
the election outcome, the United States would consider lifting sanctions and providing 
economic assistance, but the SPDC did not change.118 The United States concentrated on 
Aung San Suu Kyi, who was the leader of the NLD and suffered from detention because 
of her democratization movement, sustaining a personal relationship with Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright. 119 Suu Kyi leveraged human rights to improve Myanmar’s 
position on human rights and the promotion of democracy. 
Other than that, fighting drugs and a linkage with ASEAN composed U.S. 
interests because narcotics were tangible problems, prohibiting people from normal lives, 
and engaging with ASEAN could enlarge problem solving or economic benefits through 
multilateral cooperation. 120  After 9/11, additionally, the United States could gain 
intelligence information from Myanmar and access airspace, when operating in the 
Middle East.121 It was important to the United States to search terrorist cells around 
Southeast Asia. 122  Notwithstanding, these interests were recognized much less than 
values-centered issues, promoting democracy and human rights politically. 
                                                 
117 Ibid., 234. 
118 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy, 301. 
119 David I. Steinberg, “Myanmar: Reconciliation - Progress in the Process?” Southeast Asian Affairs 
2003 (2003): 174, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/400083. 
120 “Guidelines for U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed October 2016, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/03/guidelines-for-us-policy-in-southeast-asia. 
121 Steinberg, Burma-Myanmar: The U.S.-Burmese Relationship and Its Vicissitudes, 230. 
122 Ibid., 230. 
 39 
(3) “Pivot to Asia,” 2011–Present 
Since 2011 to the present, the United States has noted the geostrategic importance 
of Myanmar again under the “Pivot to Asia” policy in order to spend less in the Middle 
East and enhance interests in the Asia-Pacific region. With the start of the global finance 
crisis in 2007, the United States suffered from financial difficulties, and at the same time, 
China’s growth was relatively magnified.123 Because the United States thought the Asia-
Pacific region an area of such importance from a long-term perspective, the United States 
thought some actions should be followed, and Myanmar is an appropriate place for 
exercising these actions.  
By engaging more actively in Myanmar, the United States can preserve its 
diplomatic leverage in the Southeast Asia region. Since China has exploited Myanmar for 
oil, gas, and electric power and has tried to hedge its potential danger around the Strait of 
Malacca by accessing the Indian Ocean through Myanmar, the United States can use this 
strategically.124 If the United States competes with China in the same fields, it could 
check China effectively and maintain its presence in the region.  
Another U.S. interest in Myanmar is the possibility of economic development. 
Unlike before, Myanmar’s transition from a military junta to a democracy has facilitated 
U.S.–Myanmar relations. To respond to Myanmar’s regime transition, the United States 
lifted its economic sanctions gradually and terminated the sanctions as of October 7, 
2016.125 As mentioned earlier, since Myanmar has abundant natural resources, lifting 
economic sanctions and supporting democratic transition clearly has created positive 
effects on U.S. investments.126  
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Moreover, the United States sees an opportunity to sever relations between 
Myanmar and North Korea. Such a severing could contribute to U.S. policy toward North 
Korea, and to improving regional stability. 127  President Thein Sein promised that 
Myanmar would cut ties with North Korea following the United Nations Security Council 
resolutions. In this manner, recent U.S. interest in Myanmar has a more significant 
meaning in a long-term perspective to preserve U.S. presence in the region. 
b. Myanmar Strategic Interests 
Myanmar’s interests have changed depending on the goal of regime. Different 
from U.S. interests, Myanmar’s interests are located in domestic affairs. As a developing 
nation, the international situation substantially affected Myanmar’s national prestige. In 
order to avoid this challenge, the best way to keep its sovereignty, as a weak state, was by 
announcing non-aligned movement and not having diplomatic relations with great 
powers. In this way, Myanmar could avoid becoming a victim of the Cold War. Given 
this situation, Myanmarese strategic context is divided into two phases: 1) survival by 
military junta, and 2) survival by balance.  
(1) Survival by Military Junta, 1975–2010 
The military junta period could be separated into the Burma Socialist Programme 
Party (BSPP) and the SLORC/SPDC.  
BSPP (1975–1988) 
First and foremost, the most important interest of Myanmar was to protect the 
regime. Right after obtaining independence and during the Cold War, Myanmar 
experienced a turbulent period without a solid regime.128 General Ne Win staged a coup 
in 1962 and ruled the state with the “Burmese way to socialism,” pursuing isolationism 
and neutralism.129 In this period, the Myanmarese external situation and its lack of power 
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shaped the perception that there were no reliable friendly states, and Myanmar should 
keep its sovereignty to itself. With this preoccupation, misrule exacerbated the overall 
economic situation and internal stability, and in 1988, another coup happened. 
SLORC/SPDC (1988–2010) 
The SLORC learned the lesson from the BSPP’s misrule that allowing diverse 
opinions could create dangers to the survival of the regime. Thus, as shown in the 1988 
coup, state leadership regarded the military as an important guardian of the regime. 
According to the Myanmarese Constitution, the government emphasized the military role 
in the nation as follows: 
Our Three Main National Causes: non-disintegration of the Union; non-
disintegration of national solidarity; perpetuation of sovereignty. We reject 
any scheme to break up the Tatmadaw [Burmese armed forces]. No matter 
who tries to divide us, we will always remain united. Anyone who tries to 
break up the Tatmadaw is our enemy.”130  
Another Myanmarese interest was strengthening solidarity to protect regime 
security. Military leaders assumed that pluralism created instability and harmed national 
unity.131 Thus, the military controlled various possibilities in all its bearings. Military 
leaders did not admit minority groups, typically ethnic and religious groups. Not only 
that, but the military did not grant crucial power to minority groups, as it thought the 
minorities were naturally inferior. 132  From the ethnic and religious perspective, for 
example, the military believed that Burman Buddhist culture was the center and formed a 
state, which was the ethnic and religious majority and had legitimacy as it was.133 The 
persecution of the Rohingya, most of whom were Muslim, extended the assumption that 
Burman Buddhists were at the center. The military also did not accept multiparty 
competition, rejecting election results in 1990. 
Following the solidarity issues, the military perceived that rising Chinese 
influence would become problematic in retaining the regime’s autonomy. During the 
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severe economic sanctions by the West, the EU and the United States, most investment 
and economic assistance came from China, and the implicit precondition was that China 
would not interfere with Myanmarese internal affairs. They formed good relations, using 
the term, Pauk-Phaw, which meant kinfolk. 134  Yet, in accordance with greater 
Myanmarese economic dependency on China, the military feared China’s potential 
influence.135 As a result, Myanmar tried to create a balance with China, by accepting the 
United States.136 
(2) Survival by Balance, 2010–Present 
From 2010, the period could be classified by the USDP, a quasi-civilian 
government, and the NLD, the first-civilian government. 
USDP (2010–2016) 
In 2010, Myanmar had a general election for the first time since 1990. Even 
though the election was not a completely free and fair election, the military smoothly 
handed over power to a civilian government. This transition has caused some to assess 
why the military accepted the transition, and these speculations reflected Myanmar’s 
interests at this time. Broadly, three arguments exist: 1) just following the “Seven Step 
Roadmap to Democracy,” 2) pursuing economic development, and 3) hedging dangers 
from too much dependence on China. 
In 2003, the military proposed the “Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy.”137 The 
military planned this process to achieve democracy. The 2010 election was the dramatic 
and significant moment of that plan. With the carrot and stick of U.S. policy, domestic 
and international situations would lead the military to determine the moment of transition 
for their interests. 
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With the transition, the possibility of economic development arose, because the 
United States and Western countries offered the conditions to lift the sanctions and 
provide economic assistance. Although Myanmar used to have the wealthiest country 
status in Southeast Asia, the isolation policy and economic sanctions weakened their 
overall national power. To Myanmar, the transition would be a chance to attract Western 
investment based on cheap labor, geographical advantage, and ample natural resources.  
From 1966 to 2005, China provided US$138.7 million to Myanmar. 138 Some 
conflicts between the United States and China could be a burden on Myanmar, and 
simultaneously some could be an opportunity to hedge its dependent status by making 
itself more attractive to both countries. After President Obama announced the “Pivot to 
Asia” policy, Myanmar’s strategic importance seized the spotlight again, and Myanmar 
had more flexible options for those reasons.  
NLD (2016–Present) 
In this period, the strategic orientation of Myanmar has not been obvious due to 
the short time. Yet, most scholars have paid attention to the progress of the regime 
transition. Even though the NLD won the election, Myanmarese democracy was not 
sufficiently developed and institutionalized. So far, so many decisions have leaned to one 
person, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the world noted each determination. In this period, all 
movements could be an important milestone and a chance for Myanmar’s political and 
economic advancement, depending on how the government tries to maximize its 
performance.  
In addition, Myanmar’s stance should consider the U.S.–China competition not 
only to sustain its autonomy but also to develop its own country. Though both states 
agree to the need for Myanmar’s “stability and development,” a sense of suspicion about 
intentions has necessarily created a competitive environment. 139  From the Chinese 
perspective, Myanmar’s diversifying international relations, especially with the United 
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States, could be thought of as ungrateful treatment. 140  Yet, for the development of 
Myanmar, particularly to strengthen intellectual capacity and human resources from a 
long-term perspective, promoting relation with the United States is essential.141 For these 
reasons, Myanmar needs careful diplomacy not to lose both the great powers’ attention. 
c. Analysis / Conclusion 
As mentioned previously, the United States and Myanmar have had different 
strategic interests, depending on what kind of situation they were in. From 1975 to 1988, 
U.S. strategic interests in the region were part of an ideological context, and Myanmarese 
interest was in maintaining its sovereignty and autonomy. Both states had an interest in 
the context of international structure, which was shaped by the Cold War and the post-
imperialistic environment. The United States saw Myanmar as a front battlefield of 
ideological war.  
Table 2.   U.S.–Myanmar strategic interests depending on periods 
Period U.S. interests Period Myanmar interest 
1975–1988 Confrontation with Communism 1975–1988 Myanmarese Autonomy 
1988–2011 Human Rights and Democracy 1988–2011 Solidarity through Military 
2011–present Influence Increment in Southeast Asia (SEA) 2011–present 
Maintenance of diplomatic balance 
between the United States and China 
 
Even though there were tangible interests, such as resources and labor, in which 
the United States could share, those interests were relatively insignificant compared to 
strategic interests. At the same time, Myanmar did not want to be included in either camp 
and just hoped to secure its autonomy without external assistance. Ultimately, Myanmar 
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supported the non-alignment movement and sought to constrain the international society 
not to intervene its internal affairs. In this way, each state pursued different directions. 
From 1988 to the late 2000s, their strategic interests came face-to-face. On the 
one hand, the United States emphasized human rights and democratization, opposing the 
massacre in 1988 and requiring peaceful hand over the regime to accept the election 
outcome in 1990. On the other hand, Tatmadaw rejected admitting pluralism in 
Myanmarese society because they assumed that pluralism would cause regime instability 
and harm Myanmarese solidarity. As a result, the United States imposed economic 
sanctions on Myanmar, and Myanmar leaned toward Chinese support.  
Yet, in the middle of 2000s, something changed in the Myanmarese military. The 
military announced the Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy and it followed the procedure 
step-by-step. No official intentions were revealed, but some arguments proposed that 
Myanmar’s military sought to create balance in the relationship with China.  
Since 2011, therefore, the United States and Myanmar have had converging 
strategic interests. The United States has wanted to increase its presence in the region, 
checking the Chinese influence. Myanmar has desired to create diplomatic balance 
between China and the United States. Eventually, these shared strategic interests have 
created a synergistic effect in their relationship. The United States has applied the 
“calibrated engagement strategy” to achieve further reform and given incentives 
whenever Myanmar took a positive step.142 Myanmar has gradually promoted political 
and economic reforms such as a free and fair election in 2015.  
In short, during the periods of this research, these two countries’ strategic interests 
have not been compatible for a long time. Yet, in accordance with changes in the 
international situation, their national interests also changed, and commonality in their 
national interests has also increased. Such changes have facilitated their relations and, 
finally, overcome previous obstacles. 
                                                 




Through the case of Myanmar, the thesis examines to what extent 
authoritarianism affects U.S. foreign policy. Since 1975 to 2016 the extent of 
Myanmarese authoritarianism has been softened. The Myanmarese political rights and 
civil rights have increased with the development of the election process, and the softening 
is ongoing. The United States has responded to the Mynamarese changes by lifting 
sanctions. Ultimately, the softening of authoritarianism promotes U.S.–Myanmar 
relations. 
In Myanmarese changes to authoritarianism, the freedom rating increased from 
one to two and a half in 2012. Based on the “Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy,” the 
government revised the constitution in 2008. Then, the government held a general 
election in 2010. At that time, the NLD did not join the election because it bore in mind 
the 1990 fraudulent election that the military carried out. Even though the 2010 election 
was not perfectly free and fair, the military handed over the reins of government to a 
quasi-civilian government. After seeing the military keep the promise, the NLD joined 
the by-election in 2012 and general election in 2015. Ultimately, the NLD achieved a 
civilian government in 2016. During this process, the Myanmarese level of 
authoritarianism was reduced. 
Following the softening of authoritarianism in Myanmar, the U.S. government 
responded to the Myanmarese government’s performance. The United States and the EU 
gradually lifted economic sanctions and increased investment in Myanmar. As well as the 
U.S. government’s attention, President Obama promoted the personal relationship with 
Aung San Suu Kyi and respected her endeavors, devoting her life to democratization. Not 
all softening authoritarianism drew the promotion in their relationship, but all promotions 
came from the softening of authoritarianism. That was a pre-condition of the progress of 
their relationship.  
In addition to Myanmar’s softening authoritarianism, the strategic context also 
influenced the improvement of the relationship. U.S. grand strategy, represented by the 
“Pivot to Asia,” created a synergy effect to both states’ movement. In contrast to the pre-
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Obama administration, the United States has paid more attention to Southeast Asia, and 
the Myanmarese effort to democratize attracted the U.S. government’s interest. In the 
U.S. position, promoting relations had ripple effects in the region. The effect assisted the 
United States to sustain its leverage in the region. From the Myanmarese perspective, this 
change in relations could reduce Myanmar’s dependence on China and correct the 
balance to sustain its autonomy. In this regard, both states’ shared strategic interests to 
promote their relationship. 
In conclusion, this chapter finds that U.S. foreign policy toward Myanmar builds 
on the changes to authoritarianism, and both states’ strategic environments facilitate their 
relations. Earnest U.S. engagement of Myanmar started with the situation in which both 
















III. THE CASE OF VIETNAM 
For the purpose of this thesis, this chapter investigates how much authoritarianism 
helps to explain U.S. foreign policy in the case of Vietnam. This chapter looks in detail at 
the Freedom House ratings as to authoritarianism in Vietnam. Then, the chapter details 
how U.S. foreign policy has evolved historically in terms of these three variables—
political, economic, and military ties—and how much authoritarianism affects these 
relations. At the end, the chapter considers the strength of these correlations and what 
they say about cause, and looks at strategic factors as a potential explanation for the lack 
of correlation in these variables. The case of Vietnam consists of these categories: 1) the 
level of authoritarianism, 2) the correlation between authoritarianism and U.S. relations 
with Vietnam, 3) explanations beyond authoritarianism, and 4) the conclusion.  
In the first section, the chapter traces the variation in authoritarianism from 1975 
to 2016 and explains the reason that the deviated inflection occurred at that time. In the 
second section, the correlation between authoritarianism and U.S. relations with Vietnam 
would be analyzed in terms of political, economic, and military ties. The third section 
investigates the reasons for the absence of correlation between two variables. The section 
includes the causal direction, which reflects the comprehensive analysis of 
authoritarianism and U.S.–Vietnam overall ties: political, economic, and military. Plus, 
the discussion regarding strategic circumstances illuminates the context of the U.S.–
Vietnam relationship with respect to strategic interests that provide potential explanations 
for the part that could not be explained by authoritarian factor. Finally, the conclusion 
section synthesizes the U.S. foreign policy toward Vietnam.  
A. LEVEL OF AUTHORITARIANISM 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has sustained a one-party rule regime since the 
reunification between the Republic of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam. Above all, Vietnam has had restricted political rights. Basically, Vietnam has 
no electoral process by the people. As a socialist state, the Communist Party of Vietnam 
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(CPV) constitutes only “state-recognized political party.”143 In the CPV, the Politburo 
and the Central Committee dominate the unicameral National Assembly. 144  Instead, 
although the people have the right to vote, the National Assembly elects the president.145 
In this way, the CPV monopolizes political power in Vietnam. For example, Lê Thanh 
Tùng, who engaged in a reformist political coalition, and other dissidents were 
imprisoned because of “propaganda against the state.”146 Since the operations of the CPV 
and decision-making processes are not transparent, the people cannot reflect their opinion 
effectively.147 These issues well show that CPV does not allow political pluralism or 
participation. 
In addition, Vietnam lacks a guarantee of civil rights. The central government 
controls the media and restricts the freedom of expression or belief.148 Moreover, the 
government does not guarantee fair rule of law or personal autonomy.149 In 1999, for 
instance, a law on journalists was enacted that restrains them from damaging activities 
through articles, though the coverage handles factual content.150 Other than that, the CPV 
controls the anonymity of the people on the Internet and the foreign media in public 
places. Religious and academic freedoms also are objects of regulation. All religious 
agents need to register with a “party-controlled supervisory body” for religious 
activities.151 In the academic arena, scholars cannot express opinions concerning anti-
government policies and should align their perspective with the CPV’s. 152 The CPV 
constrains “freedoms of association and assembly.”153 The only labor federation is the 
                                                 













Vietnam General Confederation of Labor, which involves all trade unions as 
mandatory.154 In this manner, Vietnamese civil rights have many limitations.  
In 1982, the level of authoritarianism decreased for the first time since 1975 
because of some improvement in 1981. This came from the decision allowing the 
autonomy of state-owned enterprises (SOE) by the Council of Ministers and Decree 100/
CT/TW.155 This autonomy allowed SOEs to determine how much to produce, barter, and 
finance. The movement heralded further reforms. In the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP) Political Bureau, for example, diverse discussions occurred respecting the 
effectiveness of SOEs.156 According to Gerard Clarke, who wrote The Social Challenge 
of Reform, the VCP Central Committee announced “an end to managing the economy 
mainly with administrative orders and a switch to a period of correctly perceiving and 
applying the objective laws,” for the effective operation of SOEs.157 Through this change, 
Vietnamese enterprises and people could obtain more personal autonomy and rights 
without inefficient exploitation of the SOEs.  
In addition, Decree 100/CT/TW increased civil rights by providing an opportunity 
to have “co-operatives paddy fields” and “unused land” for a housing lot.158 The Central 
Committee guaranteed these fields on condition of “production contracts.” 159  Even 
though the policy did not succeed because of short-term allocation and instability for 
peasants, the attempt could practice legalization and derive economic reforms in 1986.160 
These two changes, which were signs of reform, introduced the concept of private 
property to the people.  
Similarly, in 1987, the doi moi of the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986 
renovated overall Vietnamese institutions to ameliorate problems from centralized 
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governance.161 The reform had several ripple effects across the overall society: the end of 
cooperative farming, which brought huge changes to rural areas and farmers; the 
education and health policies for basic human rights; minority and women’s issues; the 
start of creation of private organizations.162 In these ways, the reform, doi moi, improved 
civil rights in a variety of aspects.  
From 2000 to 2001, Vietnamese civil rights rose, through the liberalizing use of 
the Internet, Western media, and human rights improvement, releasing political 
prisoners.163 In the cities, the range of choice about Western media and Internet access 
had been widened.164 The government released 12,000 political or religious prisoners.165 
In 2006, broadened freedom of religion promoted civil rights. Vietnamese government 
admitted open religious celebration, and priests could travel in the country.166 Religious 
prisoners decreased in number from 45 to 6, and a new religious decree alleviated 
regulations, allowing “charitable activities” and freedom of travel for the clergy. 167 
Hence, the freedom rating differed from the level it had maintained since the 1980s. 
In sum, the Vietnamese level of authoritarianism has had six inflections in 1982, 
1985, 1987, 1989, 2001, and 2006. The degrees of these changes were small. In political 
rights, especially, there were almost never changes due to maintenance of one-party rule, 
which came from the Leninist principle, “democratic centralism,” resisting multipartism. 
But the changes in 2001 and 2006 were institutional improvements, not transitory acts, 
creating a lasting, if marginal, impact.  
This evolution of authoritarianism in Vietnam is represented by the Freedom 
House ratings over this period, depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Variation of freedom rating in Vietnam168 
B. CORRELATION BETWEEN AUTHORITARIANISM AND 
U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM 
The variation in U.S.–Vietnam relations is composed of political, economic, and 
military ties. The weight of each tie is shown with a graph. Political ties involve 
components, specifically, the existence of an ambassador and the number of national 
summit visits. Economic ties are defined by the amount of trade volume, and military ties 
are expressed as the amount of military aid provided by the United States. Because the 
proxy index could not include comprehensive assessment, qualitative analysis is added. 
1. Political Ties
(1) From 1975 to 1995: Rupture of Political Ties and the Beginning of New 
Relationship 
From 1975 to 1995, the United States and Vietnam had very few political ties. 
After achieving normalization in 1995, though, political ties grew quickly. In 1995, the 
United States reopened the U.S. Embassy in Ho Chi Minh City and restored full 
168 “Freedom in the World.” 
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diplomatic ties in 1997, appointing an ambassador as a representative. Secretary of State 
Albright visited Ho Chi Minh City and laid the groundwork for new U.S.–Vietnam 
relations, emphasizing the resolution of war legacies and their future economic and 
political ties.169 These two prominent issues, reopening the embassy and the visits of the 
Secretary of State, raised political ties dramatically.170  
(2) From 1995 to 2011: Engagement and Enlargement 
Subsequent U.S.–Vietnam relations have seen continual fluctuation. Considering 
the few political ties before 1995, this fluctuation could be interpreted as resulting from 
active communication and the procedure for each administration to adjust for its needs. In 
2000, both states’ presidents, Bill Clinton and Tran Duc Luong, visited each other, and 
both visits were the first visit since the Vietnam War. The visits had a historical symbol 
beyond the working achievements. Both summits tried to ease war legacies like Agent 
Orange, Prisoners Of War (POW)/Missing In Action (MIA), and human right issues. 
These topics of discussion were already dealt with in working-level meetings; however, a 
summit-level conference had ripple effects nationwide. Through the visit of Clinton, for 
example, their overall ties gained an extended opportunity such as promoting “new trade,” 
“education,” and “science and technology exchanges.”171 
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Table 3.   U.S.–Vietnam summit visits172 
State Date Name 
The United States 
August 5–7, 1995 Warren Minor Christopher 
June 26–29, 1997 Madeleine Korbel Albright 
September 6–8, 1999 Madeleine Korbel Albright 
November 16–19, 2000 William J. Clinton 
July 24–27, 2001 Colin Luther Powell 
November 15–20, 2006 Condoleezza Rice 
November 17–20, 2006 George W. Bush 
July 21–23, 2010 Hillary Rodham Clinton 
October 29–30, 2010 Hillary Rodham Clinton 
July 10–11, 2012 Hillary Rodham Clinton 
December 14–17, 2013 John Forbes Kerry 
August 6–8, 2015 John Forbes Kerry 
May 22–25, 2016 John Forbes Kerry 
May 23–25, 2016 Barack Obama 
Vietnam 
September 6, 2000 President Tran Duc Luong 
June 21, 2005 Prime Minister Phan Van Khai 
June 20–22, 2007 President Nguyen Minh Triet 
June 22–25, 2008 Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 
April 12–13, 2010 Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 
November 10–13, 2011 President Truong Tan Sang 
July 24–25, 2013 President Truong Tan Sang 
 
Similar improvement of relations occurred between two states from 2005 to 2008 
by annual summit meetings. 173  Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited 
Washington as the first Vietnamese prime minister to visit since the Vietnam War, and 
President Bush also visited Vietnam to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
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(APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in 2006. Following 2007 and 2008, both states’ summits also 
had top-level conferences. Through these reciprocated visits, both governments 
announced a joint statement, stating an “intention to bring bilateral relations to a higher 
plane” and made an agreement as to a “bilateral International Military Education Training 
(IMET) program” and “U.S. adoptions of Vietnamese children.” 174  In 2008, Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Bush derived “political-military talks,” “the 
launch of bilateral investment treaty negotiation,” “the Generalized System of Payments 
program,” “the launch of a high-level bilateral Education Task Force,” “an agreement in 
principle to introduce a Peace Corps program in Vietnam,” and “the announcement of 
new initiatives on adoptions, nuclear safety, aviation, climate change, food safety.”175 
Secretary of State Clinton had a meeting with the lower Mekong countries, including the 
Vietnamese foreign minister. They discussed an outline of the next U.S.–Lower Mekong 
Ministerial Meeting in 2010.176  
The year 2010 saw the highest political ties since 1975. Both states’ presidents 
had a meeting in the Nuclear Security Summit. The Secretary of State visited twice for 
cooperation in the Lower Mekong Initiative and signing a President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS relief.177 Even though is bilateral meeting was not planned for, their widened 
agenda increased the point of contact, and naturally they could share greater 
understanding. In this way, having frequent summit conferences created various branches 
that enabled them to engage and enlarge their bilateral relations. 
(3) From 2011 to Present: Deepening and Widening 
During this period, their bilateral relations became wider and deeper. If the 
previous period established the foundation by talking about common issues and 
institutionalizing their relations; from 2011, both administrations had an in-depth 
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discussion about current issues based on the achievement as to engagement and 
enlargement. Since President Obama adopted the “Pivot to Asia” grand strategy, in 
particular, their relations had more potential possibilities.  
To enhance U.S. interest in the Asia-Pacific region under the “Pivot to Asia” 
policy, more efforts should increase more cooperation, especially with Vietnam. 
Secretary Clinton stressed that the United States held a core interest in the South China 
Sea.178 In 2013 and 2015, Secretary John Kerry visited Vietnam and made an agreement 
for Fulbright Economic Teaching Program Participants and action for climate changes in 
Mekong.179 Then, President Obama and Truong Tan Sang launched a comprehensive 
partnership in December 2013.180 Lastly in 2016, President Obama announced a full 
lifting of the arms embargo to Vietnam.181 In this manner, from 2011, under the Obama 
administration, bilateral relations have been deepened and widened, forming diverse 
connections.  
Political ties and authoritarianism have significant correlations. The sequencing 
indicates that the level of authoritarianism did not drive their political ties; rather, striking 
changes in authoritarianism occurred whenever their political ties improved, especially, 
after both summits. Specifically, when U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Vietnam in 
2000, the level of authoritarianism became weaker and the freedom rate of Vietnam rose 
from one to one and a half. Through the President’s visit, their “trade,” “education,” and 
“technology exchanges” became more active. 182  Before the U.S. Presidential visit, 
Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong also visited New York and shared opinions in the 
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UN Millenium Summit.183 In the year 2000, when both presidents visited each other, the 
Vietnamese government released about 12,000 political and religious prisoners and 
allowed the use of the Internet more freely, including Western media.  
In 2006, when U.S. President Bush visited Vietnam, the level of authoritarianism 
also decreased, based on softening religious regulation.184 As well as the Presidential 
visit, various preparations enabled the Vietnamese government to lessen its 
authoritarianism. For example, in September 2004, the Bush administration listed 
Vietnam as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC), which might induce economic 
sanctions by the United States on the basis of the U.S. Religious Freedom Act.185 In 
response to U.S. pressure, Hanoi decided to allow Protestants in the Central Highlands to 
use “house churches” in February 2005.186 In 2005, U.S. Ambassador Michael Marine 
also pressed Vietnam, saying that obvious human rights and religious freedoms should be 
preserved for both governments to continue a good relationship. 187  Eventually, the 
Vietnamese government consented to the religious freedom improvement, and the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom lifted Vietnam from the CPC list in 
September 2006.188 
In this way, political efforts at a working level facilitated the reduction of 
authoritarianism, and meetings between both government summits decisively affected the 
level of authoritarianism. The aforementioned cases show that authoritarianism was not a 
sole driver of U.S.–Vietnam relations; rather, the U.S. foreign policy to reduce 
authoritarianism more effectively improved their relations and alleviated the level of 
authoritarianism of Vietnam. Given the premise that not only did both governments have 
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desires to achieve a fruitful outcome through the summit meeting, but also the summit 
meeting was not a common opportunity for both countries, various and enormous efforts 
to create a positive environment at the summit meeting was natural, before and after. 
Thus, both governments achieved the desired result in 2000 and 2006, fostering a free 
religious environment in Vietnam, granting the Permanent Normal Trade Relation 
(PNTR) status, and removing Vietnam from CPC list under the U.S. Religious Freedom 
Act. 189 The presidential trip could be interpreted as a national protocol event, not a 
simple trip, and entailed various effects before and after having the meeting.  
This evolution of the U.S.–Vietnam political relationship is depicted in Figure 7. 
Figure 7.  U.S.–Vietnam political ties190 
 
2. Economic Ties 
From 1975 to 2001, U.S.–Vietnam economic ties were negligible. Since the end 
of the war, Vietnam suffered from economic sanctions imposed by the United States until 
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President Bill Clinton lifted the sanctions.191 Even though the United States had lifted 
economic sanctions on Vietnam in 1994, little changed until 2001. In 2001, both 
countries made an agreement, the bilateral trade agreement (BTA), in which Vietnam 
gained conditional Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status and conditional Normal 
Trade Relations (NTR).192  
From 2002 to 2008, U.S.–Vietnam economic relations saw sustained growth, and 
the global market penetrated the Vietnam market. After Vietnam obtained the conditional 
NTR status and implemented BTA in 2001, trade volume increased rapidly. In 2006, 
Vietnam acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United States granted 
PNTR status to Vietnam.193 From 2002 to 2008, the trade balance between the United 
States and Vietnam gradually increased. Right after the BTA and conditional NTR in 
2001, the total trade volume sharply increased by 107 percent and 96 percent compared 
to prior years in 2002 and 2003, respectively.194 
Since 2009 the Vietnamese economy has taken one more step toward 
globalization. In 2008, the global economic crisis hit the Vietnamese economy, and thus, 
Vietnam exports to the United States decreased 4.7 percent in 2009.195 Yet following the 
end of the crisis, the rate of the trade volume increase became steeper than previously. 
During this period, the United States and Vietnam have gone further in terms of treaties. 
Both states joined the TPP, a regional trade agreement, and signed the agreement on 
February 4, 2016.196 Also, Vietnam consulted the United States on a Generalized System 
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of Preferences program and a Bilateral Investment Treaty.197 In 2014, the United States 
took possession of the top export partner status with 19 percent distribution.198 
The impact of the variation in authoritarianism on economic ties can be found in 
institutional improvements in economic fields. Even though distinguishing tangible 
effects in the trade volume graph is difficult, numerical analysis sufficiently verifies the 
effects of economic cooperation systematically. In 2001, both governments made an 
agreement of conditional MFN and a conditional NTR through the BTA, and in 2006, 
they also concluded the WTO and the PNTR. These institutional improvements were the 
most remarkable changes between the two countries since normalization was achieved 
with the lifting of economic sanctions. These numerical percentages support the 
correlation between changes in authoritarianism and economic ties, which were 
represented by the annual sum of bilateral trade.  
Yet, the changes in trade volume did not immediately come from the softening of 
authoritarianism. A few stages affected trade volume as follows: the increased sum in 
annual trade volume resulted from the economic agreements between Vietnam and the 
United States government, and the economic agreements came from the process of 
negotiation to achieve political purposes, when both summits had a meeting. Most 
important in these stages, political purposes could be interpreted from diverse points of 
view. Such purposes could be enhancing economic ties, promoting democracy, or other 
reasons. The only identifiable discovery through analysis is that the variation in 
authoritarianism is not a driver of improvement of economic ties. 
This evolution of the U.S.–Vietnam economic relationship is depicted in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  U.S.–Vietnam economic ties199 
 
3. Military Ties 
The military ties between the United States and Vietnam have developed slowly; 
especially, tangible results did not occur until after 2006. Figure 9 presents the amount of 
U.S. military assistance. Although the amount of military assistance does not reflect other 
aspects of U.S.–Vietnam military ties, such as the decision to lift the arms embargo and 
the existence of joint exercises, it is a tangible and countable index.200 As shown in 
Figure 9, U.S.–Vietnam military ties can be divided into three phases: 1) 1975–2005, 
reflecting scarcely noticeable relations, 2) 2005–2012, reflecting cautiously increased 
relations and institutional settlement, and 3) 2013–present, proceeding with full-scale 
military cooperation.  
In the first phase, from 1975 to 2005, no military assistance existed. The United 
States concentrated on issues of POWs and MIAs, making no other effort to enhance 
military ties. That was a secondary issue, as both sides had doubts about each other’s 
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long-term intentions. 201  For most of this period, the global Cold War climate also 
restrained U.S. interests in engaging Vietnam. But as the end of the Cold War neared, 
there arose a process of progressively understanding mutual commonalities and 
differences, developing issues of common interest, and perceiving how to deal with 
issues.202  
Various working-level contacts between states proceeded, such as those between 
“representatives of the U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs and the Vietnamese Defense Ministry’s External Relations 
Department.”203 Furthermore, Vietnamese military officers participated in diverse events, 
which were provided by the United States, like the military education program, PACOM-
hosted seminars, and multilateral conferences, which provide the opportunity to learn 
each other’s ways of thinking when they face various situations.204 In 2003, especially, a 
visit to the United States by former Defense Minister Pham Van Tra accelerated the 
normalization process in their military relationships.205 This visit had reciprocated the 
inclination of U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen in 2000.206 Then, he held talks with 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and meetings with influential U.S. officials. 
Following his visit, several unprecedented mutual visits continued.207 In November, for 
example, USS Vandegrift, a U.S. Navy vessel, entered the port in Ho Chi Minh City for 
the first time since 1975, which initiated regular U.S. Navy calls at Vietnamese ports, 
even though there were some restrictions depending on the type of vessel and frequency 
in a year.208 
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From 2005 to 2012 (the second phase), U.S.–Vietnam military ties established an 
institutional settlement. In 2005, both countries signed onto the IMET program and non-
lethal foreign military sales.209 This agreement jump-started a tangible outcome of the 
military-to-military relationship. From 2005, the United States allocated $50,000 to the 
IMET program for military assistance.210 On the one hand, the amount was not huge 
compared to other segments of the U.S. budget; however, the moment was a decisive one 
and became a cornerstone that established more practical cooperation and expanded 
possibilities, which could handle the core issues in the military.211  
With this turning point, diplomatic efforts joined the military-to-military 
process.212 In 2008, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Washington and agreed to 
the “Foreign Ministry-led political-military dialogue.” 213  Since then, Vietnam could 
anticipate strategic communication with U.S. think tanks.214 Although the strategic level 
co-operation could guarantee a bilateral dialogue regarding “regional defense issues,” 
“military modernization,” and “strategic thinking and intention,” the Vietnamese were 
reluctant and questioned U.S. motives.215 In this atmosphere, however, both countries 
had become accustomed to each other, reacting effectively and sharing a straightforward 
dialogue.216  
From 2011 to 2012, the U.S. and Vietnam governments reinforced their military 
ties more systematically by institutionalizing their relationship more specifically.217 In 
April 2011, for example, Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh facilitated co-operation 
through institutional exchange between the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and 
the Vietnamese National Defense Academy.218 Also, Vice Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh 
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made the same arrangement between the U.S. NDU National Strategic Studies and the 
Vietnamese Military Strategy Institute and the Institute for Foreign Defense Relations.219 
On top of that, the annual U.S.–Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue, the 
U.S.–Vietnam Defense Policy Dialogue, and the U.S.–Vietnam Joint Statement stabilized 
the system for developing a “strategic partnership.”220 
In the phase since 2012, both states have embraced full-scale cooperation. The 
amount of U.S. military assistance had been stalled until 2005, but by creating common 
issues and understanding from 2006 to 2012, they had institutionalized their relations for 
a more systemic co-operation. Since 2013, the amount has increased sharply and the 
governing issues also have rapidly developed. Especially, after adding the “foreign 
military financing” and “cooperative threat reduction” budget items, the amounts have 
gradually expanded.221  
Since 2013, Chinese assertive actions, such as constructing artificial islands and 
declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone, have stirred up regional instabilities. Thus, 
other than military assistance, additional military ties have emerged such as the 
“Maritime security boost plan,” which was planned for regional security in the South 
China Sea (SCS), “Strengthening Vietnam’s Coast Guard,” which supports Vietnamese 
defense from Chinese encroachment.222 Additionally, President Obama lifted the arms 
sales ban on lethal weapons on May 23, 2016, and on October 2, 2016, the U.S. Navy 
warship USS John S. McCain and submarine USS Frank Cable arrived at the strategic 
Cam Ranh Bay, marking the first U.S. naval visits there since the end of the Vietnam 
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War. 223 In this manner, the China factor has advanced closer U.S.–Vietnam military 
ties.224 
Similar to the correlation between authoritarianism and economic ties, 
authoritarianism did not directly affect U.S.–Vietnam military ties as a driver, rather 
U.S.–Vietnam political ties have immediately influenced their military ties. In 2001 when 
the level of authoritarianism decreased, their military ties did not change. Even though in 
2005, when the degree of authoritarianism declined, their military ties entered a 
significant new phase by commencing the IMET program, analyzing their relation as 
cause and effect is not enough. Rather, it is more reasonable to understand that working-
level cooperation for the moment and the political decision of President Bush had more 
impact on the military ties between the two countries.  
The improvement under the Obama administration also can be interpreted as an 
extension of the same context in the previous example. Since 1984, the U.S. government 
has imposed the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations on Vietnam, which was 
known as an arms embargo.225 After President Obama and Truong Tan Sang launched a 
comprehensive partnership in 2013, U.S. military assistance sharply increased.226 Also, 
when President Obama visited Hanoi, he fully lifted the arms embargo and added some 
words, which pressed the Vietnamese human rights issue, he said, “As with all our 
defense partners, sales will need to still meet strict requirements, including those related 
to human rights.”227 Like this, the correlation between authoritarianism and military ties 
has followed the political ties.  
In this manner, there appears to be a direct correlation between authoritarianism 
and military ties. Military ties follow the changes of authoritarianism. In this process, the 
military ties have a tendency to react with the issue-based attention to solve the potential 
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threat. For Vietnam, U.S. military ties followed decreased authoritarianism, while 
decreased authoritarianism made it easier to build military ties in response to mutual 
concerns about China.  
This evolution of the U.S.–Vietnam military ties is depicted in Figure 9. 
Figure 9.  U.S.–Vietnam military ties228 
 
C. EXPLANATION BEYOND AUTHORITARIANISM 
This section scrutinizes the correlation that the proxy scale does not include or 
exceed from the point of authoritarianism view. The section is composed of the 1) causal 
direction part, which illustrates the comprehensive correlation among four variables—the 
level of authoritarianism, U.S.–Myanmar political ties, economic ties, and military ties—
and the stories that are not contained in the graph; and the 2) strategic background part 
involves both states’ interests according to the passage of time. 
1. Causal Direction 
This chapter has looked at the correlation between the level of authoritarianism 
and the U.S.–Vietnamese relationship. Except for political ties, finding correlation is hard. 
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This section examines the overall correlation among four variables, not just between the 
level of authoritarianism and U.S.–Vietnamese relations. Furthermore, it will explain 
aspects that the graph could not capture.  
In terms of political ties, Figure 10 shows that political ties preceded the softening 
authoritarianism. Changes in authoritarianism existed in 2000 and 2006, and both years 
had high inflections of political ties, involving the U.S. President’s visit. Before the 
presidential visit, various working-level negotiations created the mood for the softening 
of authoritarianism. From the Vietnamese perspective, softening authoritarianism was a 
part of conditions necessary to enhance other ties: economic and military ties. Since 
Vietnam has many points of contact on which to cooperate with the United States and the 
United States also could obtain benefits from the cooperation, the VCP could work with 
the United States through only two events in softening authoritarianism: 2000 and 2006.  
In the economic sphere, economic ties correlated with both political ties and the 
variation in authoritarianism. Basically, political ties elicit the improvement of both 
economic ties and softening authoritarianism. For this reason, enhancing economic ties 
occurred in a similar period and phase as the softening of authoritarianism. Even though 
the level of authoritarianism was reduced in 2001 and 2006, which saw an economic 
agreement, BTA and WTO, respectively, both improvements were not directly related 
with each other. However, economic ties and softening authoritarianism followed in the 
same period as a result of the improvement of political ties. In sum, economic ties 
followed the political ties and improved at a similar time with the softening of 
authoritarianism. 
Growing military ties are the most conservative part and they are directly related 
with political ties, not with changes of authoritarianism. Fundamentally, until 2005 U.S.–
Vietnam military ties did not exist. From the start of IMET, their military ties have 
cautiously developed. Gradually, they created institutions and understood each other. 
Until 2012, the amount of military assistance only slightly increased. After military 
assistance contained the “Cooperative threat reduction” item, the amount sharply 
increased 244 percent and 6057 percent in 2013 and 2014, respectively, compared to the 
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previous year.229 This suggests that the United States engaged the military sphere to cope 
with maritime instabilities in the South China Sea territorial dispute. The following 
section discusses the extension of this assumption. 
In conclusion, overall U.S.–Vietnamese relations and the level of authoritarianism 
follow the political ties. The case of Vietnam shows that softening of authoritarianism is 
not a precondition when the United States commences a normalized relation. But, in the 
process of enhancing relations, the United States pressured the VCP, referring to the 
softening of authoritarianism as a requirement. For this reason, economic ties and 
military ties improved simultaneously or later than the change in authoritarianism.  
This evolution of U.S.–Vietnam ties is scaled and depicted in Figure 10. 
Figure 10.  U.S.–Vietnamese relations with freedom rating230 
 
2. Strategic Background 
The discussion of strategic interests traces both the United States’ and Vietnam’s 
strategic interests. Then, it analyzes how those strategic interests affect their relations. 
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a. U.S. Strategic Interests 
The U.S. foreign policy to Vietnam has been implemented as part of a regional 
strategy. In the Cold War era, the United States engaged in the Southeast Asia region 
because of the “Domino theory,” which described a phenomenon in which communism’s 
contagion would spread, and the United States should take action to block its 
spreading.231 On the basis of this theory, the United States intervened in Vietnam to 
secure the democratic regime of South Vietnam. After the end of the war, the strategic 
interests could be categorized into the following periods: 1) wiping out the war legacy 
(1975–1995), 2) pursuing American values (1995–2011), and 3) implementing the “Pivot 
to Asia” (2011–present).  
(1) Wipe out the War Legacy, 1975–1995 
 From the end of the Vietnam War until 1995, the United States had 
thought of the U.S.–Vietnam relationship from the perspective of the “Vietnam 
syndrome,” which included emotional, psychological, and political obstacles.232 During 
the Cold War era, the United States regarded Vietnam as one of the axes of communism 
and confrontation, so both states had no explicit relations during that time. Yet after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, from 1991 to 1995, the United States did not need to care 
about the ideology issue, and it just paid attention to the MIA/POWs issue. 233  To 
normalize relations with Vietnam, both states should resolve the war legacy, and the 
Reagan and Bush (41) administrations started negotiations in 1989 to 1995.234 With the 
Cambodia peace settlement, the United States negotiated with Vietnam, providing $1 
million to support wounded persons.235 By contrast efforts to resolve MIA/POW issues 
were more difficult.  
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(2) Pursuit of American Values, 1995–2011 
After the normalization and end of the war, the United States pursued American 
values, dealing with the Vietnam issue. First, the United States continuously worked with 
the Vietnamese government regarding MIA/POW issues; second, it demanded greater 
religious freedom and human rights and a diffuse liberal market system in Vietnam.236 
Three conditions supported the U.S. intention and confidence: 1) the Vietnamese 
economic reform doi moi, which reflected the need of economic development and 
recognized the defeat of the communist economic system; 2) the end of the Cold War, 
which suggested that ideological proxy war was unnecessary; and 3) normalization 
between two states, which connoted the settlement between states’ debts outwardly and 
created progress for the future, albeit both countries held a political mistrust and popular 
sentiment.  
The United States strove to improve religious freedom and human rights. 
Basically, the Vietnamese government believed that stability was a core need to secure its 
one-party regime. These examples of neighboring countries, such as Thailand’s 
democracy that had frequent coups and the Philippines’ chaotic domestic situation, 
caused Vietnam to consolidate its conservative regime.237 For these reasons, Vietnam 
concluded that it should not allow political pluralism, which could undermine the 
solidarity of the government. Nevertheless, in this atmosphere in 2005 and 2006, the 
United States produced progress within Vietnam, which guaranteed the use of house 
churches. 238  With international concern, the United States sympathized with the 
Vietnamese internal movement, which was known as “Bloc 8406” that supported the 
organization of this political association.”239 At that time, the Vietnamese Ministry of 
Public Security tried to suppress Bloc 8406; however, the international situation that 
should hold the APEC and EAS meeting repressed its anger.240 In this way, the United 
States persistently required changes regarding religious freedom and human rights. 
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The other American value was economic prosperity through the liberal market 
system. The United States regarded an economy as a basis of “national growth,” 
“prosperity,” and “influence” through the liberal market economy. 241  To enhance 
economic relations with Vietnam, the U.S. and Vietnamese governments made a BTA in 
2001 and liberalized service sectors.242 Also, the United States demanded the “foreign 
ownership of securities firms” and “express delivery service.” 243  For Intellectual 
Property Rights, the United States managed the “U.S. Special 301 Watch List,” which 
prevented Vietnamese piracy on the Internet.244 In 2008, both summits agreed to sign the 
Bilateral Investment Trade Agreement to promote foreign investment.245 In this way, 
after normalization with Vietnam, the United States pursued its principles and expanded 
its values in Vietnam.  
(3) “Pivot to Asia,” 2011–Present 
The U.S. interest in Vietnam gradually changed after 2008. The United States 
recognized China as a real threat. While the United States suffered from the global 
financial crisis, China enjoyed its rising status. After President Obama entered the White 
House, he proposed the “Pivot to Asia” strategy as a new foundation of U.S. grand 
strategy in the 21st century. Through this policy, the United States could obtain two 
representative effects in Vietnam as follows: 1) overcome economic stagnation, 2) secure 
Freedom of Navigation (FON) in the SCS.  
First, by focusing on the Asia-Pacific region, the United States can earn economic 
benefits. In economics, Europe and the United States already shaped a stable economic 
structure. They had formed cohesive economic ties and reached a stable trajectory. So far, 
in Southeast-Asia, the United States had not had many economic ties with countries 
compared to other regions. If the United States forged economic ties in SEA, the country 
could find resolution by creating ties with a new emerging market: SEA. Among these 
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situations, the United States joined the TPP to institutionalize the ties with potential 
export markets. Also, the United States could enjoy the cheap workforce of Vietnam. It 
provided not only lower unit production costs but also dispersed to reduce the production 
facilities, which had leaned too much toward China.  
To do this, securing a stable Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) in the SCS is a 
necessary condition. The SCS retains $1.2 trillion U.S. trade volume per year based on 
the year of 2012, and it would have become larger after activating the TPP.246 Without 
regional stability, companies would pay for more “insurance rates” and “longer transits,” 
this sort of destabilizing occurred in the SCS because of the maritime territorial 
dispute.247 In the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) of 2010 in Hanoi, Secretary Hillary 
Clinton said that the SCS is an issue that is directly linked with U.S. interests.248  
Second, based on the aforementioned necessity, the United States can secure FON 
in the SCS. Securing FON is one crucial interest of the United States.249 FON is one of 
underlying principles regarding maritime affairs because the United States thought that 
FON had guaranteed its influence in the world both economically and militarily. As a 
hegemonic state, the United States created a virtual circle by securing sea power for its 
national interests. Basically, sea power protected the SLOC and protects trade, 
guaranteeing economic prosperity. In order to project the U.S. influence on others, in 
addition, the neutralization of the sea is a necessary condition because the United States 
could avoid opposition from others over territorial rights. In an extension of this logic, the 
United States has sought to secure FON and the neutrality of the SCS. In this way, the 
“Pivot to Asia” policy rearranged Vietnam’s strategic value to the United States.  
b. Vietnam Strategic Interest 
Vietnamese collective memories were characterized by the conflict with external 
influences, and this perspective substantially influenced Vietnamese foreign policy. 
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During this time, Vietnam’s most important issues were to regain security stability 
without war, and recover from its battle scars. After the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 
1973, Vietnam continuously experienced various conflicts with neighboring countries. 
Vietnam continued the war until the fall of Saigon in 1975. From 1975 to 1989, the 
Vietnamese government fought with the Khmer Rouge regime, which caused the conflict 
with not only Cambodia but also China and the United States. In 1979, the Sino-
Vietnamese war occurred since China felt uncomfortable about amicable relations 
between Vietnam and the Soviet Union because of a doctrinal divergence between China 
and the Soviet Union. Also, the Chinese government supported Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge 
regime, and it thought that the invasion was part of a challenge. In this way, Vietnam had 
experienced various conflicts with neighboring countries, and those conflicts created 
many casualties and much damage. Vietnamese strategic interests can be divided into 
three phases: 1) achieving stability as a socialist state (1975–1986), 2) pursuing practical 
progress and reform under doi moi, and 3) balancing its strategic stance. 
(1) Stability as a Socialist Country, 1975–1986 
After unification, the Vietnamese Communist Party confronted two major tasks: 
1) securing communism in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, unified Vietnam, and 2) 
recovering from the battle scars. To establish communism securely within the nation, the 
VCP launched “the second battle of Saigon” in order to transplant socialism in South 
Vietnam. Since Le Duan, the General Secretary of the VCP bore in mind that the country 
should accomplish stable communism in unified Vietnam within a decade, 
unsubstantiated premature communist methods led the postwar recovery.250 As a part of 
this policy line in 1978, the VCP nationalized industry and commerce, destroying the 
private trade.251 In the agriculture sector, the VCP tried to establish collective farming in 
South Vietnam, but eventually, it proved to be an inefficient production method.252 The 
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collective farming, rising rice prices, and bad weather conditions drove the farmers to 
fail.253  
Since the spread and consolidation of communism preceded postwar recovery, the 
VCP did not manage the recovery efficiently. Lots of destruction of infrastructure, ruined 
villages, burned regions left by napalm and chemical bombings, and 3.5 million 
landmines were the visible battle scars that VCP must overcome.254 At that time, the 
VCP spent about 40 percent of budget on the military, and this restricted the VCP’s 
flexibilities and possibilities of development. 255 To attempt a breakthrough, Vietnam 
tried to reestablish its relations with the United States in 1977–78; however, the United 
States could not accept Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and alignment with the 
Soviets.256 At the end, the VCP realized that some reforms were needed. Thus, even 
though the VCP attempted to reconstruct the country with its communist methods, their 
unskillful management or systemic problems hindered the recovery.  
(2) Practical Interest rather than Ideology, 1986–2011 
During this period, the VCP became more practical, rather than ideological. 
Among its practical interests was doi moi, which had a goal of economic 
liberalization.257 The VCP realized that keeping their socialist ideological norms needed 
economic stability, and also, its previous socialistic economic system did not work. 
Before the VCP decided on doi moi, the Chinese Communist Party started economic 
reforms, and the Soviet Union also implemented Perestroika and glasnost, which means 
“restructuring and openness.”258 In this way, the needs for economic reform emerged not 
only in Vietnam, but also in the first and second largest communist states.  
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Through doi moi, the VCP reduced the state’s role in the economic arena.259 The 
VCP promoted the free market system, reduced the control of industries, and expanded 
economic interchange with foreign states. 260 With doi moi, the VCP and the United 
States started “mutual confidence-building measures,” and Vietnam accepted the plan to 
obtain political and economic benefits, the normalization and termination of sanctions.261 
In addition, Vietnam obtained $1 million in support from the United States for wounded 
people to assist with prosthetics. 262  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Vietnamese government changed its policy to accept U.S. requirements on MIA/POWs 
and negotiate for practical benefits. 263  The Vietnamese thought that its cooperative 
movement would create positive gestures from the United States. 264 Yet, the VCP’s 
opaque national affairs management by an authoritarian one-party rule and unstable 
environment undermined its attraction for the foreign investors. So, in this period, the 
Vietnamese government just improved institutions to join the international economic 
system. 
Concurrently, by enhancing the ties with the United States, the VCP improved its 
relations with neighboring countries in parallel: China and SEA countries. 265  By 
increasing ties with SEA countries, the VCP could join ASEAN as a regional member, 
not an enemy. 266 Also, the reconciliation with China provided regional stability and 
opportunity to concentrate on domestic development. Even though the territorial disputes 
were not solved in land and maritime and Chinese ambition needed be checked, the U.S. 
presence helped hedge against China. Thus, in this period, the VCP’s practical purposes 
influenced its overall diplomatic decisions. 
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(3) Balancing China through Hedging, 2011–Present  
Since 2011, the VCP’s strategic interest has been in sustaining economic 
prosperity and creating political stability; however, its maritime territorial problem in the 
SCS with China has hindered regional stability. Vietnam has felt ambivalent toward 
China because of so many conflicts and cooperation historically. From the Vietnamese 
perspective, China is a presence not only with which to cooperate, but also to be checked 
for the protection of the Vietnamese autonomy. Enhancing ties with the United States 
was best way to offset the influence of China. Through this issue, the VCP could enhance 
its strategic value to the United States, and they could establish a joint stance. 
After 2011, SCS territorial disputes have served to enhance Vietnamese status 
more independently by diversifying its diplomatic, trade, and military relations with 
neighboring countries, especially with the United States. Chinese assertive behavior 
gradually increased from this time. Before 2011, Vietnam had a tendency to lean toward 
China economically and politically because Western countries did not invest much in 
Vietnam. Since the United States pivoted to Asia, especially to Vietnam, its strategic and 
economic value has become greater.  
Because of the VCP’s efforts, the SCS dispute became an international issue; 
many neighboring countries became engaged, expressing their state’s position. For 
example, Vietnam has intensified its diplomatic relations with ASEAN to cope with 
China’s assertive policies. In July 2010 at ARF, Vietnam drew a multi-national 
diplomatic action from the conference. 267  Also, through agreements for oil and gas 
exploration with India in 2011, Vietnam aimed to check China in the SCS through India’s 
diplomatic influence, which was adversarial due to China-Pakistan cooperation.268 On 
the one hand, Vietnam strengthens its ties to the United States; on the other hand, it also 
emphasizes relations independent of the United States and China, saying that those 
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relations are separate from each other.269 By doing so, Vietnam broadened its point of 
contact with neighboring countries and maximized its national interests: 1) territorial 
sovereignty, 2) underground resources, 3) and fishery resources. 
First and foremost, Vietnam has claimed its territorial sovereignty over the 
Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes ever since WWII. 270  Vietnam has suffered from 
external threats for a long time, such as the dominant-subordinate relationship with China 
and warfare with not only France, but also the United States and China. As a result, 
Vietnamese people’s collective memories are sensitive about sovereignty matters. In this 
context, China seized the Paracel archipelagoes in 1974 and the Johnson Reef in 1988 by 
force. In addition, China’s large-scale reclamation projects and mounting naval power 
have threatened neighboring countries. Naturally, Vietnam thinks sustaining their 
territorial rights, just as they are, is its most significant interest. 
Based on territorial rights, realistic interests of Vietnam are resources. In 1968, 
the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East announced the report that said 
the SCS retained enormous buried resources. According to this report, the SCS was one 
of the top four oil fields of the world, holding oil, gas, tin, and manganese. 271 
Furthermore, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation reported that approximately 
203 billion tons of oil deposits exist in the SCS, and compared the SCS to a “second 
Persian Gulf.” 272  Even though the calculated amounts differ depending on the 
organization, the fact is that the SCS holds substantial economic value.  
Another resource that Vietnam can exploit in the SCS is fishery resources. 
Seafood production is a substantial proportion of the food industry among Asians. In 
2013, for instance, the “Marine Capture Production” in Asia recorded 68 percent of the 
world’s capture, and the report showed that Asians consumed at least two times more 
seafood than Westerners. Vietnamese protein intake percentage from seafood is 11.5 
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percent versus the United States’ of 5 percent.273 Also, the SCS includes 1.72 million 
vessels and 5.4 million people.274 In China’s case alone in 2013, the scale of the fishing 
industry was $289 billion a year, and nearly 10,000 fish processing companies held 
400,000 workers.275 In this way, the SCS has potential capabilities that could stimulate 
the fishing industry tremendously.  
c. Analysis/Conclusion 
Following the deep conflict triggered in the Gulf of Tonkin, U.S.–Vietnam 
relations have taken a long time to recover. From the Vietnamese perspective, many 
brutal wounds of war, from the first to third Indochina Wars, formed a collective 
consciousness, which was negative and doubtful of Western society. Similarly, from the 
U.S. perspective, the Vietnam syndrome undermined U.S. interests in the Southeast Asia 
region because the United States was reluctant to intervene directly, reflecting U.S. 
public opinion. These historical legacies affected each other, whenever they interacted. 
As a result, both groups had a tendency not to engage with each other as much as 
possible, and their strategic interests did not overlap in the historical context. From 2011, 
however, their structural strategic context formed a different balance of power in the 
region, and Southeast Asia members started to adjust their position in accordance with 
their national interest.  
Table 4.   U.S.–Vietnam strategic interests depending on periods 
Period U.S. interests Period Vietnam interest 
1975–1995 Wiping out war legacies 1975–1986 Stability as a socialist state 
1995–2011 Pursuit of American values 1986–2011 Practical development 
2011–present Influence Increment in SEA 2011–present Maintenance of diplomatic balance between the United States and China 
                                                 






During the first phase, both states had different strategic interests. The United 
States concentrated on the MIA/POW issues, which was significant to U.S. domestic 
politics and American pride. On the other hand, the VCP focused on the consolidation of 
its newly started communist party and recovery from the prolonged war. Their shared 
interest was solving a war legacy. For a U.S. MIA/POW and Vietnamese wounded 
person, both governments had limited cooperation. The United States provided aid for 
wounded people, and Vietnam shared MIA/POW information. Thus, both governments 
cooperated within a restrictive range when dealing with each other. They barely arrived at 
an agreement in 1995 under the name of normalization, but made no conspicuous 
changes. 
In the second phase, they collaborated on more practical matters with extended 
ranges. Since 1986, the VCP tried to reform their economic lean toward a free market 
system, realizing that the communist economic system did not work. Their economic 
condition worsened, and they needed some leverage to tip the balance. These changes 
and the VCP’s needs were the benefit to achieve the U.S. stance. The United States 
welcomed the VCP’s pro-free market movements. They had shaped various bilateral 
agreements, which intensified their economic ties: the BTA and conditional NTR/MFN in 
2001, the PNTR and WTO in 2006. In this way, their shared strategic points of contact 
created diverse economic cooperation. 
With the global financial crisis in 2008, China became a truly rising threat that 
compelled the United States to consider measures to check China, and the Obama 
administration has shaped a strategic point of contact under the slogan, “Pivot to Asia” 
since the year 2011. To reduce its reliance on the Chinese labor market, the United States 
tried to find new investment markets. The United States increased the level of 
cooperation with Asian countries, and Vietnam attracted U.S. concerns based on its 
geographical position and a cheap labor force.  
In addition, the territorial dispute in the SCS among part of the ASEAN states and 
China undermined regional peace and stability, U.S. allies and partners, and eventually, 
U.S. interests and international orders. Hence, the United States responded to the dispute 
not only autonomously, but also with bilateral and multilateral approaches with 
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neighboring countries. For example, the United States made efforts such as a realignment 
of maritime strategy and the FON operation periodically in the SCS, or providing aid and 
the maritime security boost plan to enhance capabilities of the joint cooperation system. 
In this way, the need to check China turned the pivot of the United States to Vietnam.  
Similarly, Vietnam also had a strategic interest in checking China. Historically, 
Vietnam had been involved in Chinese culture for such a long time, and suffered from a 
dominant-subordinate relationship, and now also formed relations under the same regime 
type. On the other hand, they had territorial disputes around borders. Their subtle 
governance relations influenced forming an ambivalent mindset between them. From 
Vietnam’s perspective, regional stability and the SLOC should be secured as a 
precondition for stable investments and trade. This perspective encourages the VCP to 
create checks and balances to China. So, the VCP hedges its dangers by enhancing ties 
with the United States. Overall ties have gradually increased during the second and third 
phases, especially in third phase, as security problems strengthened economic and 
military relations. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter examines the extent to which authoritarianism has affected U.S. 
foreign policy with Vietnam. Since 1975 to 2016, Vietnamese authoritarianism has not 
much softened. The VCP has sustained a one-party rule regime, and the Vietnamese still 
have restrictions on political and civil rights. Often, sporadic changes have occurred, but 
these changes were not enough to satisfy the Vietnamese. Nevertheless, the United States 
enhanced its ties gradually, and recently their overall ties have grown, including military 
ties. This case shows that the level of authoritarianism is not the only factor to influence 
U.S.–Vietnam relations.  
Vietnamese authoritarianism has slightly changed from phase one to two. In 1999, 
the VCP relieved the extent of restrictions on Western media and released 12,000 
political or religious prisoners. These issues increased the freedom rating in the following 
year. Similarly, in 2006, the Vietnamese government admitted open religious celebration 
and gave the freedom of travel to priests. Thus, the changes of Vietnamese 
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authoritarianism were limited in narrow civil liberties, and their political rights such as 
free elections and freedom of speech remain restricted by the VCP.  
Although Vietnamese authoritarianism has not much improved, the United States 
has promoted its overall relations. After lifting the trade embargo in 1994, the United 
States gave Vietnam a PNTR and MFN status and concluded a BTA, WTO, and finally 
TPP. In 2014, the United States became a top export partner of Vietnam. Additionally, in 
a military respect, the United States has provided the IMET program since 2005, partially 
lifted the arms embargo in 2014, and fully lifted it in 2016. Vietnam also rewarded the 
U.S. for this action by permitting access in Cam Ranh Bay, which is a significant 
strategic port on the Indochinese peninsula, including South China Sea. 
In conclusion, the Vietnamese case reveals that the level of authoritarianism has 
not applied as a driver of U.S.–Vietnam relations. Rather, political ties led overall ties 
and facilitated softening authoritarianism. This phenomenon illustrates that warmer U.S. 
foreign policy may proceed in some cases without softening authoritarianism. In the 
Vietnam case, this may or may not have involved the strategic decision to check China in 
the Asia-Pacific region. In general, the case shows that softening authoritarianism is not 




Until now, the thesis has examined Myanmar and Vietnam cases with respect to 
the influence of the level of authoritarianism in those countries and U.S. foreign policy. 
The cases have different complexions depending on political, economic, and military ties 
or states. In this chapter, the discussion 1) compares and contrasts the two cases 
depending on political, economic, and military ties regarding the similarities and 
differences exist; 2) presents the North Korea case in more abbreviated terms; 3) outlines 
the relevance and importance of the outcome of the research; and 4) proposes the 
direction of future research. 
A. COMPARING TWO CASES 
In this section, the two case studies are explained from the political, economic, 
and military perspectives. Each classification has both similarities and differences. 
Political ties have an opposite correlation. The Myanmarese case shows that changes in 
the level of authoritarianism affect U.S.–Myanmar political ties. Yet, the Vietnamese 
case illustrates the opposite tendency in which political ties, especially a U.S. presidential 
visit, precedes the change in the level of authoritarianism. From the economic 
perspective, the cases of both Myanmar and Vietnam show that the political ties precede 
the economic ties. 
From the political perspective, the Myanmarese and Vietnamese relation between 
level of authoritarianism and political ties differs. This may be because U.S.–Vietnam 
relations shared more interests besides the softening of authoritarianism, so the United 
States had motivations to start negotiations balancing reluctance to engage an 
authoritarianism regime. The strategic background suggests that the China factor 
facilitates U.S.–Vietnamese relations because Vietnam is a strategically important 
country that practically copes with conflicts with China. 
In the economic area, both Myanmarese and Vietnamese economic ties follow 
political changes. Both cases showed that the improvement of economic ties resulted 
from political actions. In Myanmar’s case, economic sanctions, which consider 
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businesses’ position, left room to enable investment before sanctions took effect, even 
though the governmental action was not intended to facilitate investment. The 
Vietnamese case also displays that U.S.–Vietnam political ties enhance economic 
outcomes. By concluding an economic treaty such as BTA or WTO, the VCP could 
create a background for economic growth. Both cases have progressed in different 
intentions and contexts, but it is clear that political ties induce the enhancement of 
economic ties. A difference in economic ties is the correlation with authoritarianism. In 
the Myanmar case, for the variation of economic ties, softening authoritarianism should 
precede the economic ties because that was the precondition that enabled easing the 
sanctions and enhancing political ties. However, in the Vietnam case, the correlation 
between authoritarianism and economic ties is vague. Economic ties and softening 
authoritarianism occurred as a result of political ties.  
The characteristic of military ties is the most conservative tie, altering its changes 
at the end of overall ties compared to political and economic ties. In the case of Myanmar, 
academics and Congress debate whether or not U.S.–Myanmar military ties should 
improve. On the other hand, in the Vietnamese case, its military ties sharply went up 
from 2012, when the United States felt the threat of China to regional security. The 
United States determined that strengthening its military ties with Vietnam could enhance 
its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. In this manner, both military ties have a tendency 
that reflects a political purpose.  
B. THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA 
For the purpose of this research, the North Korean case should be a part of the 
chapter; however, overall variations have not changed. Therefore, the thesis provides a 
more abbreviated examination of changes in both North Korean authoritarianism and 
U.S.–North Korean political, economic, and military ties. 
1. Level of Authoritarianism 
North Korea is the most unique authoritarian regime in the world. Its regime 
could be described as a conflation of one-party rule and sultanism. Externally, the regime 
assumes a one-party rule; however, its internal inclination has a sultanistic propensity. 
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The North Korean single party, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), has conducted all 
state affairs since 1949. During the 1960s, Kim Il-sung established and consolidated its 
sultanistic regime to prevent a power struggle by purging high-ranking party members 
and top military officers who were the closest figures to him.276 Through several purges, 
Kim Il-sung became an “utmost political norm” himself. 277  Then, he looked for a 
successor. 
Simultaneously, with the cessation of the power struggle possibilities, Kim’s 
family hereditary succession started. First of all, Kim Il-sung appointed his close family 
members to important posts and institutionalized his leadership.278 To institutionalize 
Kim Jong-il’s power, for example, the KWP amended the constitution to elevate the 
status of Kim Jong-il. 279 Through these efforts, North Korea completed a sultanistic, 
family-centered, and monarchical system, removing conflicts that could occur between 
powerful men in the state.280 In this way, the systemic dictatorship has become stable in 
North Korea. 
Basically, the North Korean level of authoritarianism has had no changes from the 
worst freedom rating: one. North Korea has had a lack of political rights and has 
maintained a hereditary system. In 1994, Kim Jong-il inherited power from Kim Il-sung, 
and Kim Jong-un also succeeded his father in 2011. No electoral procedure exists to 
select a successor to the supreme position in the state. The Supreme People’s Assembly 
legislators also have no process to become a member of parliament.281 The KWP selects 
all the members, based on who has a sense of loyalty to the KWP.282 An example of this 
includes the 2015 election, which recorded 99.97 percent turnout and all candidates 
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selected by the party. 283 Of course, political pluralism does not exist. In 2015 year, 
approximately 80,000 to 120,000 prisoners suffered in detention camps.284 
Civil liberties also cannot be guaranteed. Fundamentally, the North Korean 
government restricts the flow of information. No private media are run; all publications 
are censored strictly; only a few officials and scholars use the Internet.285 The regime 
fabricates a public environment for its “party speeches,” “propaganda banners,” and 
“communist-inspired culture.”286 The freedom of religion does not exist, even though the 
constitution guarantees it. 287  In addition, academic freedom also does not exist. All 
curriculums must pass an inspection by the state.288 North Korea has no independent 
judiciary. The absence of rule of law becomes an environment in which the state 
arbitrarily wields absolute power without hesitation. 289  North Korea is a communist 
country that ostensibly pursues equality, in the form of a social strata called songbun.290 
But North Korean citizens do not have freedom of movement, so deportation is common 
in North Korea.291 In this way, North Korean civil liberties are virtually nonexistent. 
2. Variation of U.S.–North Korea Relations 
The variation of U.S.–North Korea relations is composed of political, economic, 
and military ties. Political ties are reflected in the average between existence of an 
ambassador and the number of national summit visits. Economic ties contain the sum of 
trade volume, and military ties include the amount of military assistance provided by 
United States. To supply the gap of the proxy scale, this paper combines the qualitative 
analysis. 
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a. Political Ties 
Generally, the United States and North Korea have had no political ties since 
1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. First of all, both states 
do not have an embassy and ambassador who can represent the national position to each 
other. In the U.S. position, the United States has three representatives to work for North 
Korean affairs: “the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy,” “the U.S. 
Special Envoy for North Korean Human Right Issues,” and “the Acting U.S. Special 
Envoy for the Six-Party Talks.”292 North Korea also does not operate an embassy or have 
an ambassador in the United States. Instead, North Korea’s ambassador to the United 
Nation represents its diplomatic opinion indirectly.293 
Both the United States and North Korea have almost never had summit visits 
except for U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Korbel Albright’s visit to North Korea in 
2000. Because of Secretary Albright’s visit, U.S.–North Korea political ties temporarily 
rose from one to two.294 When Secretary Albright visited North Korea, she discussed 
with Kim Jong-il the missile program in North Korea, transparent nuclear facilities, 
normalization between the states, and an examination of the possibility of a presidential 
trip to Pyongyang. 295  Notable achievements existed that when Secretary Albright 
attended the 55th anniversary of the communist party, she interpreted Kim Jong-il’s 
intention that he desired to resolve the missile problems.296 
In this way, U.S.–North Korea political ties created an expectation to solve the 
missile problems. However, the cancellation of the visit by President Clinton to North 
Korea dampened the relationship for both states. Nevertheless, Secretary Albright made 
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an effort to accomplish a summit conference between President Clinton and Kim Jong-il 
in the days after the next President Bush was elected. However, the domestic 
environment for the next President imposed restraint on President Clinton.297 In the end, 
President Clinton cancelled his visit 35 days before the visit was scheduled to occur. 
b. Economic Ties 
The U.S.–North Korea economic ties are almost zero since the Korean War based 
on the sum of trade volume between the United States and North Korea. From 1975 to 
2015, the amount of trade recorded has been almost non-existent. Right after the Korean 
War occurred in 1950, the United States imposed an economic embargo.298 As time went 
on, some embargoes were lifted, but other problems such as nuclear proliferation and 
missile development, human rights records, and cyber attacks created a different type of 
sanctions. As a result, their economic ties have been strained. The United States 
minimized its trade amount and limited it to essential goods like “food,” “medicine,” and 
“other humanitarian-related goods.”299 Also, U.S. foreign aid and assets of suspicious 
individuals are in the control of the United States.300 
In 2008, President Bush declared a national emergency based on the risk of fissile 
material proliferation by North Korea.301 Then, the United States has managed “North 
Korea Sanctions Program” since the Trading with the Enemy Act ended in 2008.302 Even 
though the United States lifted its terrorism designation of North Korea, the Department 
of Commerce and the Department of Treasury maintain North Korea with a dangerous 
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status. 303  For example, the Department of Commerce classifies North Korea as a 
“Country Group D,” which is the second most constrained country group for 
commerce. 304 If some businesses try to trade with North Korea, they must obtain a 
license that is issued from the Office of Foreign Assets Control.305 Dianne E. Rennack, a 
specialist on North Korea, describes the limitation of the commerce with North Korea as 
follows: 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control, within the Department of the 
Treasury, must approve any U.S. importation from North Korea, and 
weighs all requests in the context of proliferation, money laundering, 
counterfeiting, bulk cash smuggling, narcotics trafficking, or other illicit 
economic activity, and who in North Korea might profit. Any transfer 
involving the government of North Korea, any senior DPRK government 
official, or a DPRK person or entity designated as a Specially Designated 
National pursuant to any of the series of executive orders relating to North 
Korea, to a person under U.S. jurisdiction is prohibited.306  
In this way, the United States restrains trade and commerce with North Korea 
because of North Korea’s various inappropriate behaviors. The economic sanctions take 
on the character of punishment, and the U.S. foreign policy tried to correct North Korea’s 
actions. So far, the North Korean elite have not considered any advice from international 
communities and are focused on the development of a weapon system, ignoring the 
people’s hardships. Naturally, economic ties between the states have drawn parallel lines 
and have deteriorated even more. Without North Korea changing its position, it seems 
that restoration of economic ties between the U.S. and North Korea would be difficult.  
c. Military Ties 
U.S.–North Korea military ties reflect the amount of U.S. military assistance 
provided to North Korea. Their military ties have been almost zero from 1975 to 2014. 
After the Korean War, the Truman administration imposed the Trading with the Enemy 
Act on North Korea, and it made commerce and arms sales with North Korea illegal. The 
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Act remained in effect until June 27, 2008, when the Bush administration removed North 
Korea from the list of countries affected by the Act. Yet, shortly before lifting application 
of the Trading with the Enemy Act, President Bush issued executive order number 13466 
on June 26, 2008, which caused the “North Korea Sanctions program.” This executive 
order declared a national emergency to block nuclear fissile material in the Korean 
Peninsula.307  
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institution Arms 
Transfers Database, the United States sold 87 light helicopters, Huges-500D/MD, in 
1983.308 Even though illegal arms trade occurred in 1983, this did not mean normal 
military ties between the two states. In this way, U.S.–North Korea military ties have no 
meaningful relation since the Korean War. 
In this manner, the North Korean case has no changes in either the level of 
authoritarianism or U.S.–North Korea relations. Since the purpose of this research is 
examining the correlation among their variations, one of indices should have changes. 
For these reasons, this case just shows the status. Yet, the North Korea case suggests that 
beyond deep U.S. opposition to North Korean nuclear and missile development, sustained 
authoritarianism in North Korea may also be functioning as a significant inhibitor of the 
relations between the United States and North Korea. 
C. RELEVANCE AND IMPORTANCE 
Through the thesis, the paper has scrutinized the correlation between 
authoritarianism and U.S. foreign policy to Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea. 
Overall, the cases suggest that diverse variables contribute to U.S. foreign policy, rather 
than having regularity and consistency depending on just one factor: the level of 
authoritarianism.  
In the case of Myanmarese regime transition, U.S. foreign policy followed the 
variation of authoritarianism and reacted with responsive attitudes. However, the extent 
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of changes in U.S. foreign policy to Myanmar was not large compared to the Vietnamese 
case. On the contrary, in the Vietnamese case, the United States has improved its overall 
relations to one of the highest levels in the Southeast Asia region even though the 
Vietnamese authoritarianism did not fall as much as in Myanmar. These two conflicting 
cases suggest that even though the United States considers the softening of 
authoritarianism and promoting democracy as major interests, there might be other 
factors that enable the United States to positively engage beyond the softening of 
authoritarianism. 
One of the findings in this research, especially in the Vietnam case, is that the 
U.S.–Vietnam political ties have driven the overall economic and military ties, including 
the softening of authoritarianism. In this context, if the cause and background of the 
increasing political ties were analyzed more minutely, the researchers could find more 
rational leverages that enhanced the U.S.–Vietnam relationship. This research 
hypothetically implies that if their strategic shared interests become high, the relations of 
U.S.–authoritarian states could improve regardless of the change or lack of change in 
authoritarianism. Yet, in this situation, the United States would not forget to push the 
opposite state to reduce the extent of authoritarianism as a condition.  
D. LIMITS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research shows the extent to which U.S. foreign policy considers the level of 
authoritarianism within a nation as a factor and the degree to which they are correlated. 
To test this relation, the research used a modified version of the freedom rating that 
represents the level of authoritarianism and a proxy scale that could reflect the U.S. 
political, economic, and military foreign policy to an authoritarian state. The 
shortcomings of the limited proxy scale used here can be improved in by future research. 
If the proxy scale contains more factors in the index, a more definitive outcome may be 
forthcoming.  
To improve strategic interest research, developing ways that enable researchers to 
compare the extent of shared strategic interests would be promising. Such measurements 
would enable researchers to exhibit and compare the influence of strategic interest 
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relative to authoritarianism. Also, such comparison facilitates analyzing the extent of 
leverage between authoritarianism and strategic interests and provides the criterion to 
assess how much states have a shared interest and its effect on U.S. foreign policy 
beyond the consideration of an authoritarian regime.  
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APPENDIX A. MYANMARESE DATA309 
 Political ties Economic ties Military ties 





1975 0 O 4 3.31 1.00 0 1.00 
1976 0 O 4 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1977 0 O 4 0.06 1.00 0 1.00 
1978 0 O 4 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1979 0 O 4 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1980 0 O 4 0.38 1.00 0.07 1.02 
1981 0 O 4 0 1.00 0.07 1.02 
1982 0 O 4 0 1.00 0.31 1.08 
1983 0 O 4 -0.42 1.00 0.34 1.08 
1984 0 O 4 0.78 1.00 0.22 1.06 
1985 0 O 4 0 1.00 0.42 1.10 
1986 0 O 4 0.14 1.00 0.48 1.12 
1987 0 O 4 -1.54 1.00 0.54 1.13 
1988 0 O 4 0 1.00 0.45 1.11 
1989 0 O 4 56.00 1.05 0 1.00 
1990 0 X 1 225.10 1.20 0 1.00 
1991 0 X 1 235.10 1.21 0 1.00 
1992 0 X 1 149.00 1.13 0 1.00 
1993 0 X 1 91.70 1.08 0 1.00 
1994 0 X 1 135.20 1.12 0 1.00 
1995 0 X 1 317.60 1.29 0 1.00 
1996 0 X 1 580.70 1.52 0 1.00 
1997 0 X 1 878.80 1.79 0 1.00 
1998 0 X 1 683.60 1.61 0 1.00 
1999 0 X 1 304.00 1.27 0 1.00 
2000 0 X 1 91.11 1.08 0 1.00 
2001 0 X 1 15.29 1.01 0 1.00 
2002 0 X 1 17.70 1.02 0.06 1.02 
2003 0 X 1 1855.15 2.67 0.07 1.02 
2004 0 X 1 729.93 1.66 0 1.00 
2005 0 X 1 110.35 1.10 4.54 2.11 
2006 0 X 1 724.24 1.65 0.20 1.05 
2007 0 X 1 2.19 1.00 0 1.00 
2008 0 X 1 603.42 1.54 0 1.00 
2009 0 X 1 27.15 1.02 0 1.00 
2010 0 X 1 6669.40 7.00 0 1.00 
2011 1 X 2 1117.68 2.01 0 1.00 
2012 2 O 6 496.87 1.45 0 1.00 
2013 0 O 4 584.29 1.53 0 1.00 
2014 2 O 6 946.22 1.85 0 1.00 
2015 0 O 4 - - - - 
2016 2 O 6 - - - - 
Note: VN: Visit Number; NDR: Normal Diplomatic Relations; 7S: 7-point Scale; FDI: Foreign Direct 
Investment; MA: Military Assistance 
                                                 
309 “Freedom in the World,” Office of the Historian, Burma - Travels of the President; Office of the 
Historian, Burma - Travels of the Secretary of State; UNCTADstat, UNCTADstat - Table View - Foreign 
Direct Investment: Inward and Outward Flows and Stock, Annual, 1980–2014; Office of the Historian, 
Burma - Visits by Foreign Heads of States; USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (GREENBOOK). 
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APPENDIX B. VIETNAMESE DATA310 
 Political ties Economic ties Military ties 





1975 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1976 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1977 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1978 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1979 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1980 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1981 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1982 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1983 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1984 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1985 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1986 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1987 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1988 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1989 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1990 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1991 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1.00 
1992 0 X 1 4.60 1.00 0 1.00 
1993 0 X 1 7.00 1.00 0 1.00 
1994 0 X 1 223.40 1.04 0 1.00 
1995 1 X 2 451.30 1.07 0 1.00 
1996 0 X 1 948.40 1.16 0 1.00 
1997 1 O 5 675.10 1.11 0 1.00 
1998 0 O 4 828.00 1.14 0 1.00 
1999 1 O 5 899.90 1.15 0 1.00 
2000 2 O 6 1188.80 1.20 0 1.00 
2001 1 O 5 1513.60 1.25 0 1.00 
2002 0 O 4 2974.80 1.49 0 1.00 
2003 0 O 4 5878.60 1.97 0 1.00 
2004 0 O 4 6380.80 2.05 0 1.00 
2005 1 O 5 7824.40 2.29 0 1.00 
2006 2 O 6 9667.00 2.59 0.13 1.03 
2007 1 O 5 12535.90 3.07 0.30 1.07 
2008 1 O 5 15690.50 3.59 0.52 1.13 
2009 0 O 4 15385.00 3.54 1.58 1.39 
2010 3 O 7 18573.40 4.07 2.77 1.68 
2011 1 O 5 21803.00 4.60 3.63 1.89 
2012 1 O 5 24890.60 5.11 3.55 1.87 
2013 2 O 6 29687.80 5.90 11.17 3.73 
2014 0 O 4 36348.50 7.00 24.55 7.00 
2015 1 O 5 - - - - 
2016 2 O 6 - - - - 
Note: VN: Visit Number; NDR: Normal Diplomatic Relations; 7S: 7-point Scale; TV: Trade Volume 
Investment; MA: Military Assistance 
                                                 
310 “Freedom in the World” Office of the Historian, Vietnam - Travels of the President - Travels; 
Office of the Historian, Vietnam - Visits by Foreign Leaders; U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade, Trade in 
Goods with Vietnam. 
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APPENDIX C. NORTH KOREAN DATA311 
 Political ties Economic ties Military ties 
VN NDR 7S TV($) 7S MA($) 7S 
1975 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1976 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1977 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1978 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1979 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1980 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1981 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1982 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1983 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1984 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1985 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1986 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1987 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1988 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1989 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1990 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1991 0 X 1 - - 0 1 
1992 0 X 1 0.1 1.00 0 1 
1993 0 X 1 2 1.00 0 1 
1994 0 X 1 0.2 1.00 0 1 
1995 0 X 1 11.6 1.01 0 1 
1996 0 X 1 0.5 1.00 0 1 
1997 0 X 1 2.5 1.00 0 1 
1998 0 X 1 4.4 1.00 0 1 
1999 0 X 1 11.3 1.01 0 1 
2000 1 X 2 2.8 1.00 0 1 
2001 0 X 1 0.5 1.00 0 1 
2002 0 X 1 25.2 1.04 0 1 
2003 0 X 1 8 1.001 6,000 1 
2004 0 X 1 25.3 1.04 0 1 
2005 0 X 1 5.8 1.00 0 1 
2006 0 X 1 0 1.00 0 1 
2007 0 X 1 1.7 1.00 0 1 
2008 0 X 1 52.2 1.08 0 1 
2009 0 X 1 0.9 1.00 0 1 
2010 0 X 1 2.9 1.00 0 1 
2011 0 X 1 9.4 1.01 0 1 
2012 0 X 1 12 1.01 0 1 
2013 0 X 1 6.6 1.01 0 1 
2014 0 X 1 24 1.03 0 1 
2015 0 X 1 4.8 1.00 - - 
2016 0 X 1 - - - - 
Note: VN: Visit Number; NDR: Normal Diplomatic Relations; 7S: 7-point Scale; FDI: Foreign Direct 
Investment; MA: Military Assistance 
                                                 
311 USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (GREENBOOK); U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade, 
Trade in Goods with North Korea; “Freedom in the World,” Office of the Historian, Korea, North - Travels 
of the Secretary of State. 
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